BYU Law Review
Volume 2008

Issue 6

Article 5

12-18-2008

From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage: Comity Versus Public Policy
in Inter-jurisdictional Recognition of Controversial Domestic
relations
Lynn D. Wardle

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lynn D. Wardle, �������� �������������� ���� �������������� ����������������: ������������
������������ ������������ ������������ ����
����������-����������������������������
���������������������� ����
�������������������������� ����������������
������������������, BYU L. Rᴇᴠ. 1855 (2008).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage: Comity Versus
Public Policy in Inter-jurisdictional Recognition of
Controversial Domestic Relations
Lynn D. Wardle*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION: COMITY VERSUS DOMESTIC POLICY
INTEGRITY FOR FAMILY RELATIONS ............................... 1856

II. POSITIONING CURRENT DEBATES OVER THE IMPORTATION
OF CONTROVERSIAL FORMS OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
WITHIN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW .. 1865

A.

The Bitter Controversy Over Inter-jurisdictional
Recognition ofSlavery .............................................. 1865
1. The evolution of the recognition of t<:Jreign slaves
in English jurisprudence ...................................... 1868
2. The evolution ofthe recognition of foreign slaves
in American conflicts jurisprudence ..................... 1878
B. Other Controversial Domestic Relations Issues in
American Conflicts Law ........................................... 1893
l. Interstate recognition ofinterracial marriage ........ 1893
2. I mer-jurisdictional recognition of polygamy ......... 1896
3. Interstate marriage recognition and consanguinity
restrictions .......................................................... 189 8
4. Interstate recognition of teenagers' marriages ....... 1900
5. Interstate recognition of prohibited adoptions and
other domestic relations ...................................... 1902

* Bruce C. Hafen l'roti:ssor of Law, ). Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. This article was originally presented at the BYU Law Review Symposium 011
Crmttmj}(}rary Cmtjlict ofl,mvs Ismes in Family Law at the). Reuben Clark Law School, room
472 )RCB, Brigham Young University, on Friday, February I, 2008. The valuable research
assistance of j essame Petersen, Kvlc Woods, Melisa Whiting, and Patricia Dills is gratdi.tlly
acknowledged.

1855

,\

[2008

I

C. Prevailing Principles Used Historically for Resolving
Conflicts Issues Concerning Controversial Forms of
Domestic Relations .................................................. 1903

I

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Ill. CONTEMPORARY INTER- JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
REGARDING GAY FAMILY RELATIONS ............................. 1906

A.

Judicial Decisions Concerning Interstate Issues
Regarding Same-Sex Marriages, Civil Unions,
Domestic Partnerships, Adoptions and Their
Incidents .................................................................. 1907
B. Positive Law Developments Concerning Interjurisdictional Gay Family Issues ................................ 1909
C. Lessons From Recent Developments Regarding
Recognition of Gay Family Relations ........................ 1915

IV. CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF CONFLICTS AND THE
PRIORITY OF DOMESTIC POLICY .................................... 1919
APPENDIX A: STATE APPELLATE OR FEDERAL COURT
DECISIONS INVOLVING CONFLICTS OF LAWS RE: SAMESEX DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIPS 2000-07 ....................... 1921
APPENDIX B: LEGAL STATUS OF SAME-SEX DOMESTIC
RELATIONSHIPS ALLOWED IN THE UNITED STATES ....... 1923
APPENDIX C: LEGAL STATUS OF SAME-SEX DOMESTIC:
RELATIONSHIPS PROHIBITED IN THE UNITED STATES ... 1924
APPENDIX D: LEGAL STATUS OF SAME-SEX UNIONS IN THE

WORLD .......................................................................... 1925
I. INTRODUCTION: COMITY VERSUS DOMESTIC POLICY INTEGRITY
FOR FAMILY RELATIONS

The creation of new or substantially redefined family relationship
forms to include same-sex couples has sparked not only passionate
intra-jurisdictional controversy about those domestic public policies,
but also enormous inter-jurisdictional controversy about whether
(and, if so, under what conditions and subject to what limits) such
relationships should be recognized in other jurisdictions. Since
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federalism in family law has been the prevailing rule since the
adoption of the Constitution of the United States in 1788, there
have been significant differences in the family laws of the American
states since the beginning of the nation. 1 Thus, it is not surprising
that the American states have taken at least six very different
approaches regarding the controversy over whether same-gender
family relationships should be legally treated as valid domestic
relationships: ( 1) some states allow same-sex marriage; (2) some do
not allow same-sex marriage but have created marriage-equivalent
same-sex civil unions (sometimes called domestic partnerships) with
essentially all the same legal rights and incidents as conjugal
marriages; ( 3) some do not allow same-sex marriage or marriageequivalent same-sex unions, but have created limited status
categories with (or have extended) some limited benefits and
relational incidents to same-sex couples; (4) some states allow samesex marriage, and/ or equivalent civil unions, and/ or limited
domestic unions with limited benefits, and also allow same-sex
partner adoption; ( 5) some states do not allow same-sex marriage,
equivalent civil unions, or limited same-sex unions-or-benefits, but
do allow same-sex partner adoption; and (6) some states do not
allow same-sex marriage, equivalent civil unions, limited domestic
unions with limited benefits, or same-sex partner adoption. All of
these different approaches to gay family relations may come into
cont1ict across jurisdictional boundaries. The determination of such
cont1icts of laws requires resolution of tensions between interjurisdictional comity, local interpretations of international law
principles, and the strength of local domestic relations policies
ret1ecting the interests of the interested sovereigns, especially the
deciding jurisdiction's sovereign.
As discussed in further detail below/ constitutional, statutory or
appellate court interpretations of laws in at least eighteen American
states permit the formation and existence of at least some family
relationships for same-sex couples, including one or more of the

l. See generally LYNN D. WARDLE &

LAURE~CE

C.

NOLA~,

FUNDAMENTAL

PIU:-.:CIPLES OF FAMILY LAW 27 (2d ed. 2006) ("[T]here is no such thing as THE family law of

the United States of America. Rather, there are two (or fifty-two, depending on your
perspective) sets and systems of family law in the United States, varying tremendously in
substance, procedures and structures from each other.").
2. See infra Part III .A.
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f(>llowing: same-sex marriage/ marriage-equivalent same-sex civil
unions or marriage-equivalent domestic partnerships, 4 limited status
and/or benefits f()r same-sex partners, 5 and, in at least some
circumstances, adoption of children by same-sex couples or partners. 6
On the other hand, at least fC:xty-tlve states have constitutional or
statutory prohibitions against same-sex marriage/ and at least half of
the state legislatures that have addressed the issue of adoption by
same-sex partners have prohibited such adoptions.s
A thoughtful lawyer recently asked: "[W]hat happens when these
diHerent laws collide, f(>r example, when a same-sex couple that
married in Massachusetts moves to a state that only recognizes civil
unions? ... What about custody of children? Inheritance? Divorce?
The legal term for these questions is 'conflicts of law. "' 9 He
predicted: "Such conflicts will dominate future legal arguments

3. California and Massachusetts; sec In reMarriage Cases, 1X3 !'.3d 3X4 (C1l. 200X I;
Goodridge v. Dcp't ofl'ub. Health, 79X N.E.2d 941 (Ivbss. 2003).
4. Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, and Vermont. Sa JJOtemllv
Co:-.:N. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-3Xaa to 46b-38oo (200X); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457-A
(2008); N.J. SlAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-28 to 37:1-36 (West 2008); 2007 OR. LAWS ch. 99,
repriuted in OR. REV. STAT. at end of ch. 106 (2007 ); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 ( 2002 ).
5. Alaska, District of Cohtmbia, Hawai'i, Maine, and Washington. Sa ALl. CiYil
Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 7Xl (Alaska 2005); D.C. CODE§ 1-307.68; HAW. RFV
STAT.§ 572C ( 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 701 (2003); WASH. REV. CoD~.§ 26.60
(2008).
6. Calil(>rnia, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiatu, Massachusetts, 1\:cw
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, l'ennsylvani.1, Tennessee, and Vermont. Sa
JJenerally Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (C.1!. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 4Sa726a (2004); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d X37, 862 (D.C. l99S); In rePetition of K.M., 653
N.E.2d XSX, X99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Mariga v. flint, 822 N.E.2d 620, 62X (Ind. Ct. App.
2005); In reAdoption of Galen, 680 N.E.2d 79,73 (Mass. 1997); N.H. REV. SL·\T. AN:-.1. §
170-R:4 (2005 ); ht reAdoption of Two Children by H .N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 536 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 199S); In reAdoption of Charles B., 552 :-..J.E.2d 8X4 (Ohio 1990); In re
Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, I 196 (Pa. 2002); litre Adoption of M.).S., 44 S.W.3d
41, 55-S6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Vr. STAT. A:-.:N. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (200S); N.Y. Dml.
REL. LAW§ 110 (McKinney 200X).
7. See infra App. C.
8. See infra Part III.A. For a discussion of the states that allow and prohibit adoption
by same sex partners, sec Lynn D. Wardle, 17Je "hmer Livn'' ofChildrclt i11 Ltsbi!fay Adoption:
NarratiJJes and Other Concerm, IX ST. THOJ'viAS L. REV. 511, 513-1 S (2005) (noting tlut
timr state statutes bar same-sex adoption, while linn· allow it; but some state courts h.wc
overturned public policies against same-sex partner adoption).
9. Hillel Y. Levin, Mt~rria.rp:s, CiJJi! Unions Collide iu Court, HARTfORD C:oL:RANT,
)an. 15, 200X, twailable at http:j /www.jpus.org/timtm/index.php>showtopic~95&mode~
threaded.

1858

1855]

From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage

about same-sex marriage." 111 I agree. The May 2008 Calit(xnia
Supreme Court decision in In re Marria;_qe Cases, 11 legalizing samesex marriage in Califcm1ia (which, unlike Massachusetts, allows
couples from other states to enter into marriages prohibited in their
home states 12 ) underscores the significance of this issue since that
ruling has, f(x the first time, opened the door tc)r general interstate
exportation of same-sex marriages within the United States.
Controversies about the importation of, interstate and
international eHects ot~ and the legal status and consequences in
f()reign jurisdictions of same-sex marriage, civil unions, domestic
partnerships, and gay/lesbian couple or partner adoptions have been
increasing in the past decade. Since 1993 when the Hawai'i Supreme
Court suggested that it might mandate legalization of same-sex
marriage in Hawai'i, 13 there has been an ongoing debate over the
inter-jurisdictional diects of these "new fc)rms of domestic
relations," created by same-sex families. 14 A key concept in those

I 0. !d.; sa also Lisc1 M. Cukier, MarritllfC and l'state Plannilllf Under Uoodridge v
DI'H, BOSTON B.J., Nov./Dec. 2004, at 14, 14-15 ("What will happen when same-sex
couples who marry in Massachusetts \"acation out of state, travel between diHcrem states, visit
out of state relatives, and relocate to a new state>
[T]he prcdietabilitv and portabilitY of
m.liTi.lge can only be approximated f(>r same-sex rcouples I .... l M ]anv lesbians and gay men
question whether there is clll)' truly appreciable bendit tor same-sex] marriage.").
II. 183 P.3d 3X4 (Cal. 200X).
12. The 2003 decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in GoodridJre P.
Dep 't of l'ub. Hmlth, 79X N. E.2d 941, 948, 967 (2003), allows f(>r very limited exportation of
same-sex marriage, since only residents of Massachusetts could enter into same-sex marriages
initially. Later, the Massachusetts high court opined that residents of Connecticut, Maine, New
York, "'e\\' Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont might also marry in the state, as same-sex
marriage was not t<>rbiddcn in those states. Cote-Whitacre \'. Dcp't of Pub. Health, X44
:-.:.E.2d 623, 631-32 (Mass. 2006); Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 2006 WL
320875X (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006 ). Subsequent appellate court decisions in New York,
Henuwde:::; P. Robles, X55 N.E.2d I, 5 (N.Y. 2006), and Rhode Island, Chambers 1'. Ormiston,
935 A.2d 956, 95X (IU. 2007), ruled against same-sex marriage (or, in Chambers, divorce).
The Connecticut situation is dubious, St'C Rosengarten \'. Downes, X02 A.2d 170, 179-81
(Conn. App. Ct. 2002), leaving only Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont residents
potentially eligible to marry as nonresidents in Massachusetts.
13. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993). Later a trial court in Hawai'i so
ruled, .<ec Baehr\'. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996 ), only to have that ruling superseded by an amendment to the state constitution. Sec
HAW. C:o~sr ..1111end. I,§ 23 (passed Nov. 199X); Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw.
I.EXIS 391, *X (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999) (dismissing appeal as moot).
14. !-'or articles in support of recognition, see Julie A. Greenburg, W!Jen Is Stmtc-Scx
Marria_qc h:JJal--Full Faith and Credit and Sex Discriminatio11, 3X CREIGHTON L. REV. 289
(2005 ); and Mark P. Strasser, "Dcfendin_q" MtlrriaHe in Li,_qht of the Moreno-CiebourneRomcr-1 .awrence Juri.,prudmcc: Why DOMA Cannot Ptrss Muster After Lawrence, 3X
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debates is the influence of comity in inter-jurisdictional recognition
of relationships that are not permitted in some jurisdictions.
Mter the Hawai'i Supreme Court's Baehr decision, the exportimport issue regarding same-sex marriage became serious. 15 Many
same-sex marriage advocates wrote law review articles asserting that
if Hawai'i, or any other state, legalized same-sex marriage, all other
states would be required by the "mandatory comity" of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution to recognize same-sex
marriage. For example, Deborah M. Henson wrote that "the
Supreme Court has allowed far too much laxity with the full faith
and credit mandate." 16 She argued that Article IV, Section l should
be interpreted to compel other states to recognize same-sex marriage
if Hawai'i or some other state legalizes same-sex marriage. 17 Several
other writers in law review and other publications have made similar
arguments calling for reading the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
require states to recognize same-sex marriages, 18 asserting
compulsory recognition and enforcement in all states of "marital

CREIGHTON L. REV. 421 (200S). See also Kees Waaldjk, Others May Follow: The Introduction of
Marriage, Quasi-Marriage, and Semi-Marriage for Same-Sex Couples in European Countries,
38 NEW ENG. L. REv. S69 (2004). For articles in support of state choice, see Patrick J.
Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to the Same-Sex Marriage
Debate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 3S3 (200S); David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan,
Definition or Discrimination? State Marriage Recognition Statutes in the "Same-Sex Marriage"
Debate, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 3 (1998); L. Lynn Hogue, Examining a Strand of the Public
Policy Exception with Constitutional Underpinnings: How the "Foreign Marriage Recognition
Exception" Affects the Interjurisdictional Recognition of Same-Sex "Marriage," 38 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 449 (200S ); and Ralph U. Whitten, Full Faith and Credit for Dummies, 38
CREIGHTON L. REV. 46S (200S).
1S. While serious, it was not beyond humor. One advocate of same-sex marriage
recognition wrote: "After the Baehr decision, people joked that '(i]f it happens in Hawai'i, gay
and lesbian people will sink the island .... We will all arrive the same day, get married, and the
island will just go under."' Cynthia M. Reed, When Love, Comity, and Justice Conquer Borden:
INS Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 97, liS (1996)
(citing Brad L. Graham, Lesbian Couple Is Wed--Sort Of, ST. LOUIS PosT DISPATCH, Mar. 2,
1994, at SF).
16. Deborah M. Henson, Will Same Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full
Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitation on States' Choice of Law Regarding the Status and
Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawai'i's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J.
FAM. L. SS1, S86 (1993-1994).
17. Id. at S84-9l.
18. Nancy Klingeman & Kenneth May, For Better or for Worse, in Sickness and in
Health, Until Death Do Us Part: A Look at Same-Sex Marriage in Hawai'i, 16 U. HAW. L.
REV. 447, 483-8S ( 1994); see also Barbara J. Cox, Same Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We
Marry in Hawai'i Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033,
1041 n.23 (1994).
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decrees" recogmzmg same-sex marriages, 19 or asserting that "[ i ]f
Hawai'i legalizes same-sex marriages, the effects will be felt across
the country since other states must recognize gay marriages
performed in Hawai'i under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. " 20 Likewise, one of the leading gay-rights
advocates (and the successful trial lawyer in Baehr v. Miike), Evan
Wolfson, wrote: "[F]ull faith and credit recognition [of same-sex
marriages] is mandated by the plain meaning of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, and by basic federalist imperatives. " 21 He further
argued: "[I]fyou're married, you're married; this is one country, and
you don't get a marriage visa when you cross a state border. " 22
Thus, advocates of same-sex domestic relations openly promoted
the use of federal law (the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
principle of strict comity as a federal common law choice of law
principle) to force unwilling states to recognize same-sex marriages.
Not surprisingly, legislators in many states were convinced of the
need to respond with legislation to bar the importation of same-sex
marriage. Many states (twenty-seven by 2006) enacted statutes
expressing unequivocally strong public policy against same-sex
marriage. 23 Congress also acted under its power to declare the
interstate "effects" of state laws, records, and judgments. The
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), enacted by Congress in 1996,
prevents the use of federal full faith and credit doctrine or other
federal comity or conflicts rules to force any state to recognize same19. Habib A. Balian, ~ote, 'Til Death Do Us Part: Granting Full Faith & Credit to
Marital Status, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 397,401,406-08 (1995).
20. Anne M. Burton, Note, Gay Marriage-A Modern PJ-oposal: Applying Baehr v.
Lewin to the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 177, 195 (1995); see also Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshhold: Equal Marriage Rights
for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 567, 612 n.196 (1994-95) (referring to another forthcoming article arguing that
Full Faith and Credit mandates interstate recognition of same-sex marriage). But see Balian,
supra note 19, at 402 n.22.
21. Evan Wolfson, Director, The Marriage Project (Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc.), Winning and Keeping Equal Marriage Rights: What Will Follow Victory
in Baehr v. Lewin? A Summary of Legal Issues, at 4 (March 20, 1996 ).
22. Evan Wolfson, Director, The Marriage Project (Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc.), Winning and Keeping the Freedom to Marry for Same-Sex Couples-What Lies Ahead After HawtTi'i, What Tasks Must We Begin Now?, at 2 (Aprill9, 1996).
23. See Joshua Baker, Status, Substance, and Structure: An Interpretive Framework for
UnderstandinJi the State MarriaJie Amendments, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 221 (2004-2005 );
William C. Duncan, Revisiting State Marriage Recognition Propisions, 38 CREIGHTO:\ L. REV.
233 (2005 ).
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sex marriages from other states; it also declares that same-sex
marriages will not be recognized for purposes of federal law. 24
However, DOMA docs not forbid or prevent any state from
voluntarily recognizing same-sex marriage or any other controversial
domestic relations. 25 Many profound issues of conflicts law arise
concerning contemporary controversial (mostly gay or lesbian)
domestic relations, despite the presence or absence of existing federal
and state legislation. 26
Interstate and international conflict of laws issues concerning
controversial forms of domestic relationships arc not uncommon in
American legal history. It is helpful to remember this in the f1cc of
the passion and politics surrounding the contemporary controversies
over the interstate recognition of new (or redefined old) fcm11s of
domestic relations for same-sex relationships today. 27 They have been

24. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, § 2 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C) ("No
State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give
ctlect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of anv other State, terri ton·, P'"session,
or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated .1s a marri.1ge
under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising
from such relationship."); sec also id. § 3 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7).
25. For a discussion of the ti:deral Defense of Marriage Act and analvsis of related
conflicts issues, sec Symposium, Interfurisdictional MarriaJfC RcCitif1litimt, 32 C:RFJt;HTO~ L.
REv. 1 ( 1998); and Symposium, Implicatiom of Lawrence and Goodridge jilr the Rco~quitimt
of Same-Sex Marria,qes and the Validi~v of DOMA, 38 CREIGHT0:-.1 L. REV. 233 (2005 ). Sa
also Symposium, Interfurisdictional Reco,_quition of CiPil U1tions, Domestic l'artnas!Jips, mtd
Bentjits, 3 AVE MAIUA L. REV. 393 (2005 ).
26. Developing scholarship seems to confinn earlier analysis that Congress had the
proper and constitutional authority to enact DOMA. See Gillian E. Metzger, Cmt,tTrcss, Article
IV, and Interstate Relations, I20 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1493-94 (2007) ("Not surprisinglv,
given the dearth of Effects Clause legislation, little precedent exists on the scope of Congress's
power under that clause, particularly regarding congressional power to contract the credit
othenvise due state laws and judgments. The text of Section I, however, supports reading the
Etlects Clause in a parallel fashion to Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, resulting
in Congress having authority to enact recognition requirements that might be bnuder or
narrower than those imposed by the courts.").
27. The objection that these are not really "ncw" fcm11s of bmily relationships but
merely the expansion and extension of old f(mns to new categories of eligible persons is, at
best, merely a semantic quibble. Of course, as to civil unions and domestic partnerships, the
quibble is bctually and linguistically indefensible-they arc new in both fcm11 and substance, in
label as well as in existence. As to same-sex marriage and gay/lesbian adoption, the
incorporation of a pre-existing label (e.g., "marriage" or "adoption") hils to coJKeal the realitv
and significance of the nature of the change; it is indisputable that the newly legalized hm11 of
the relationships have profoundly altered the historic and ubiquitous understanding of those
relationships as they have been known to the law and to society in all prior dec.1des and
centuries (and millennia, tCJr marriage), as well as in virtually all cultures, societies, and nations.
While the label may be old, the definition of the relationship is undeniablv new. Most
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a regular subject of controversy in American conflict of laws
jurisprudence throughout the history of our nation. Indeed, at the
very time of the f(mnding of our nation, interstate recognition of one
particularly notorious fcJrm of domestic relations, slavery, was already
a deeply divisive issue, resulting in several special provisions being
included in the 1787 Constitution of the United States-including
some unique choice of law provisions. The litigation that followed
led to some of the most incendiary judicial cases decided in the first
seventy-five years of our nation's existence. There have continued to
be many other serious contentions over inter-jurisdictional
recognition of other controversial family forms.
The tension between comity and domestic policy when a
f()reign-created controversial relationship is introduced into another
jurisdiction is neither novel in the area of family law nor is it
insoluble. The recent emergence of a new set of controversial forms
of domestic relationships as an outgrowth of the gay rights
movement-namely same-sex marriage, marriage-equivalent civil
unions, domestic partnerships, and adoptions by gay and lesbian
couples and partners (herein collectively "gay family relations")-and
the rejection of interstate importation of such relationships into
jurisdictions where they arc not permitted are likely not overly
threatening to our Union and its legal values when viewed in this
historical context. This Article will position the contemporary debate
over conflicts of laws issues regarding gay family relations within the
long history of public controversies involving inter-jurisdictional
recognition of controversial forms of domestic relationships. It will
examine the intersection of t:1mily law and conflict of laws to
ascertain the principles that have guided the resolution of those past
controversies, to inform the resolution of current controversies over
same-gender marriage, same-sex civil unions and domestic
partnership benefits, and gay and lesbian adoptions. It will compare
the conf1ict of laws treatment of similar issues in history with current
developments regarding inter-jurisdictional recognition of gay family
relations.

importcmtlv, perhaps, t(Jr this Article, the enormous, intense, ongoing controversy surrounding
the redctinition of "marriage" and "adoption" to include same-sex couples underscores the
nmTin· and the perceived significance of the change. To attempt to en de the serious questions
such changes present by claiming that these arc not really "new" t<m11s of those relationships
simply denies the rcalitv of the controversy.
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This Article seeks first to ascertain the controlling principles used
in the past to resolve inter-jurisdictional disputes over controversial
domestic relations. It then applies these principles to current interjurisdictional conflicts involving recogmtton of gay family
relationships. Finally, it will discuss the tensions, constancies, and
changes in this controversial area of conflict of laws.
Part II of this Article reviews the history of interstate recognition
of controversial forms of domestic relations. Part II.A begins with
interstate issues regarding slavery. Part II.B examines the subsequent
controversies concerning interracial marriages and the highly
contentious conflict of laws issues that arose concerning interjurisdictional avoidance and enforcement of anti-miscegenation laws
in the century following the end of the Civil War. In the last half of
the nineteenth century, interstate and international recognition of
another controversial form of domestic relations, polygamy,
produced some interesting Anglo-American judicial decisions about
inter-jurisdictional issues that later led to remarkable difficultiesand, ultimately, repudiation-by the middle of the twentieth
century; those cases are reviewed in Part II.B.2. Less well-known but
similarly divisive cases in the twentieth century involved interstate
issues involving evasive marriages of teenagers, which are reviewed in
Part II.B.4. Similar conflicts involving consanguinity restrictions on
marriage are reviewed in Part II.B.3. In Part II.B.S historical
precedents involving interstate issues concerning controversial forms
of adoption, including adoptions of adults generally and adoptions of
or by homosexual partners are reviewed. Then, in Part II.C, the
principles governing the historical resolution of conflicts involving
controversial family relations are discerned and analyzed.
Turning to present times, Part III of this Article provides a brief
report and review of reported legal developments involving interstate
issues regarding same-sex domestic relations for the twelve years
from 1996-2007. Thus, in Part III.A, judicial decisions involving
such questions as interstate recognition of same-sex marriages, civil
unions, domestic partnerships, and of specific benefits or rights to
benefits, as well as obligations or duties that flow from those
relations, are noted to illustrate the breadth of contexts in which
these conflicts issues arise. The diversity of cases is also illustrated
with cases addressing interstate recognition of contracts signed
before, during, or upon termination of such relations, in addition to
alimony, property division, and related orders concerning rights and
1864
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duties flowing from or resulting from those adult horizontal
domestic relationships. Additionally, interstate recognition of
adoptions by gay and lesbian couples, rights or duties (including
custody and visitation), and the incidental aspects or consequences of
such parent-child relations (including child support) have also arisen
in cases that are cited. In addition to these judicial decisions, positive
law statutory developments concerning inter-jurisdictional gay family
issues are reviewed in Part III.B, as well as constitutional
amendments and provisions that have come into force during this
period of time that address inter-jurisdictional gay family issues.
II. POSITIONING CURRENT DEBATES OVER THE IMPORTATION OF
CONTROVERSIAL FORMS OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS WITHIN THE
HISTORY OF AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW

A. The Bitter Controversy Over Inter-jurisdictional Recognition of
Slavery
Because slavery differs from other domestic relations in several
significant ways-including the legalization of force to compel slaves
to maintain their oppressed position-direct comparisons between
slavery and other controversial domestic relations are obviously not
of general application. However, the slavery cases do represent very
well the conflict of laws principles that are in tension in and that
underlie inter-jurisdictional recognition of controversial domestic
relations such as the others discussed in the balance of this Article,
including, inter alia, interstate recognition of same-sex family
relations today. The inter-jurisdictional recognition of slavery in the
United States not only illustrates the development of choice of law
principles governing interstate recognition of controversial domestic
relations in the United States, but is necessary in understanding these
principles. The factors in tension and, especially, the balance between
comity and public policy in determining how slavery relationships
were recognized in different states sheds light on how states have
historically balanced local values and interstate realities.
While today we tend to look back upon slavery as a unique legal
aberration, at common law slavery was "a domestic relation" and was
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regulated as part of the law of domestic relations. 2 s At one time it
was agreed that slaves, though lacking in legal status, were
considered to be part of the master's domestic family. 2 ° For example,
long before American independence, John Locke explained in his
Second Treatise of Government that "a master of a family with all
these subordinate relations of wife, children, servants and slaves,
l are l united under the domestic rule of a f:m1ily . . . . " 30 Likewise,
Blackstone wrote that the four great categories of personal relations
known in English law were husband and wife, parent and child,
guardian and ward, and master and servant. 31
The tradition of slaves being considered legally as part of the
family of the slave-owner dates back at least to Roman times. In
Roman law, the family included "all the descendants of a living
ancestor, including adopted persons, also the servants and the slaves
that were under the legal power (potestas) of the ancestor who was
called the paterfamilias. "' 2 The head of the household, or
paterfarnilias, controlled the lives and property of all the members of
his hmily, including wives, children, slaves, and certain other
relatives and dependents; the slaves were in many ways like sons.-'·'
A Roman household might contain t(mr classes of subordinates:
slaves, children (both in potestate), women in hand (in manu) and
persons in handtakc (in rnancipio) . . . . All of these were in the

28. Sally f'. <._;oldbrb, "No Cil'ilized System ofjustia ": "I he Fate of" t!Jc Violwcc A;raiust
\Vrmtclt Act, 102 W.VA. L. REV. 499, 531-32 (2000); )ill ELline H.1scbv, Fedcmlism mtd t/;c
Famih• Rwmstmcted, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1299 ( 1998).
29. Goldf:1rb, supra note 2X, at 530.
30. )OliN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, e.g. 303-304 (David Wootton
ed., Mentor 1993) (1690) ("ralnd the bmily is as much a bmily, .md his power as
paterbmilias <lS gre.lt, whether there be <111)' slaves in his bmily or no").
31. I WIJ.LIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAIUES *422--23.
32. WILLIAM BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES Ob ROMAN L\W :\ND THEil\ REL'\'IION TO
THE J\lODERN LAW 212 ( 1938). See He~terally Amir Aaron Kakan, '!7JC EJ>olutirm of Amaiw11
!.ail', fi-rmt Its Rrmmu Or~qiu to the l'rcsmt, 48 0RANl;E COUNTY I.AW. 31, 42--43 (Feb.
2006).
33. Indeed, "in view of the autocratic power of the paterfizmifitu it is not easv to sec
much difference in primitive r Roman] bw between the positions of son .md sLwes." B.W.
BUCKlAND & ARNOI.Il D. McNAll\, ROMAN l.AW .'\Nil COMMON LAW 26 (2d ed. 1965).
"[T]he m.1stcr had power over the sLwc (potest.ls dominica) corresponding to the power of
paterEunilias m·cr his son (potestas parria)." Bl'RDICK, .wpm note 32, at l X9; .rcc al.ro O.F
ROBINSON, THE SOURCc.S Of' RoMAN LAW II X ( 1997) (stating that in matters of private l.!w
"the sl.1vc could be fitted into the legal treatment of sons, when he was being thought of .1s
being a rational being. . .").
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power of the head of the

t~m1ily

who has dominus (owner or

master) to the slaves, and pater to the tree. 34
The Roman family was an empire within the empire. It was
"governed by the paterfamilias. The wife, the children, the slaves,
the farm-house, the flocks and herds [we ]rein his hands." 35
The tradition of slaves being considered part of the family
survived to some extent in the American colonies. Moreover, some
scholars have noted that part of the reason that the Southern States
resisted abolitionists' efforts so vigorously was a corrupted form of
the principle that we today call family autonomy or parents' rights.
Southerners viewed abolition as a threat to the integrity and
independence of the institution of the family as they knew and
understood it. 36
Since slavery was a form of "domestic relations," how the issue of
inter-jurisdictional recognition of slavery was resolved in AngloAmerican law may provide some historical guidance regarding how
controversial modem f()rms of family relations may be treated in
conflict of laws. The legal history shows an evolution from a
primitive practice of the dominance of the principle of comity to a
more mature rule deferring to strong local domestic policy .

.H.

HENRY )01-1:-.; ROllY, I RO!vi1\N PRIVATE LAW IN THE TIMES Of' CICERO ,\:-.;ll Of' THE

Ai':lO:-.:l:-.;r:s 52 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1902). SaHmerally id., vol. II, at 52-]7() (discussing
the Roman f:11nily).
35. FRU)l·:RICK PARKER WALTON, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE RJJMAN LAW
70 ( 1920) ("The paurjimtilias determines who shall belong to the brnily .... He can expel a
member ti·om the bmilv. No member of the tdmilv hut himself can own anything except upon
sufferance. Thcv cannot marry without his consent, .md even if thcv arc married, he can
divorce them. He has the power of lite and death over wife and child and grandchild no less
than m'Cr the slaves or the oxen.").
36. Hasd.1y, ntpm note 2X, at 1299 (stating that the South opposed abolition because it
represented !Cder.1l imrusion imo domestic relations); Kristin A. Collins, Federalism',- Fallacy:
1he Earlv Tmditimt of Federal Familv /,aJV and the lnPmtirm of States' R(qhts, 26 CARDOZO L.
RE\'. 1761, 1844 (2005) (proposed !Cderal regulation of slavery constituted "an ominous
thre.n tc>r slave owners"); Suzanne H. jackson, A1arriaHcs of ConPertience, Interuatirmal
MtrrrilljfC Uroker.l', "Mail Order Brides,'' and /)omestic SerJ!itude, 38 U. ToL. L. REV. X95, 917
(2007) ("During congressional debates over the Thirteenth Amendment, southerners in both
the House .md the Senate raised the tcrrif),ing specter that abolishing involuntary servitude
would also abolish patriarchal bmily rights .... ").
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1. The evolution of the recognition offoreign slaves in English
jurisprudence
Prior to the Norman conquest, chattel slavery modeled in
Roman law was widespread in Anglo-Saxon England. The Doomsday
Book recorded in 1086 that between ten and twenty-five percent of
the people of England were slaves. 37 The Normans, lacking a
tradition of chattel slavery and believing that free men would be
more productive, set about emancipating chattel slaves. 38 "Though
Saxon chattel slavery disappeared within sixty years of the Norman
Conquest, many English remained villeins: 'Villeins constituted the
major portion of the English population as recorded in Domesday
Book. "' 39 Villeinage was a form of feudal slavery akin to both
serfdom and chattel slavery. Villeins regardant were attached to the
land, while villeins in gross were attached to their lord personally.
While the legal disabilities of the villein and their similarity to chattel
slaves are disputed among historians, 40 it is undisputed that villeins
could be bought and sold and had no significant rights as against
their master. 41 Blackstone notes that "if they ran away, or were
purloined from [their master, they] might be claimed or recovered
by Action, like beasts or other chattels." 42
Recent scholarship has identified what may be deemed the first
(oldest) slavery-recognition case in English law, decided in the year
1259. 43 It may have involved villeinage rather than chattel slavery. 44

37. See generally DAVID A.E. PELTERET, SLAVERY IN EAlUX MEDIAEVAl. ENGI.A:-;ll:
FROM THE REIGN OF ALFRED UNTIL THE 1WELHH CENTURY 7H ( 1995 ), cited in Steven M.
Wise, The Entitlement of Chimpanzees to the Common La1r Writs of' J-fabms Corpus and Dr
Hominc Replegiando, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 219, 241-42 (2006-2007).
38. Wise, supra note 37, at 242.
39. ld. (citing DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY 1:--: WESTER.>-; CULTURE
39 ( 1966)) (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 242 n.103 (citing competing descriptions of Pillcina,_qc).
41. See PAUL R. HYAMS, KI:-;G, LORDS A:--:n l'EASA:-;Ts IN MEDIEVAL EN<._;LAND: THE
COMMON LAW Of VILLEINAliE 1:--: THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES 2-3
(Clarendon Press 1980 ); sec also Jonathan A. Bush, The First Slave (And Whv He Matters), 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 599,614 (1997) (showing that the Pillein was tree to all the world except
slave to his master).
42. BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *92.
43. See CALENDAR OF THE PATENT ROLLS, 43 Henry III, A.D. 1258-1266, at 28
(1910). This is discussed in Bush, supra note 41, at 615-20. Bush, in turn, credits Paul Hvams
as the discoverer of Bartholomew 'J CaJe. I d. at 616 n.56 (citing HYAM~, supra note 41, at 222
n.2).
44. Bush, supra note 41, at 614-19.
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One Roger de Lynton, later identified as an Italian, a knight of
Apulia, had brought with him to England one Bartholomew,
"t()[merly a Sarcean" who had run away. 45 "Roger had already
dispatched his squire to find the fugitive, and he then sought a royal
order that all persons should assist his search. That order was
granted." 46 Professor Jonathan Bush comments:
From this body of doctrine, the terse report of Bartholomew and
Roger impliedly drew five distinct points: l) that a master was free
to travel with his slave, retaining ownership rights during and after
the sojourn (the sojourner rule); 2) that foreign or non-Christian
status, or both, might justifY enslavement (the initial enslavement
rule); 3) that conversion to Christianity ("sometime a Saracen"
implies presently not a Saracen) need not act to manumit a slave
(the conversion rule); 4) that a foreign determination of slave status
should be accepted fin England] (the comity rule); and) 5) that once
fimnd to be a (uJJitive accordinJJ to jiJreign law) a slave should be
returned (the fugitive rendition rule). 47
At this time (the middle of the thirteenth century) in England,
villeinage was still permitted and widely practiced. There was no
significant conflict between recognition of the status and incidents
(including the duty not to run away) of slavery with the domestic law
of England. In that context, application of the principle of full
comity was non-controversial. Note how the notion of comity, that
core principle of modern conflicts law, aided the legal importation
(by recognition) of foreign slavery into England. The legal approach
of using comity to justifY the recognition of imported slaves persisted
in England for at least another two centuries, and dominated
conflicts law in slavery cases in some American states until the Civil
War. 4 x
Comity is not a neutral principle when it comes to acceptance or
rejection of controversial domestic relations, although it has the
advantage of sounding neutral, reasonable, and non-political. 49 Thus,

45. Id.at61S.
46. !d.
47. !d. at 617 (emphasis added).
48. Sec iufm !'art ll.A.2, notes 92~165 and accompanying text.
49. Sa Bush, supra note 41, at 624~25. "In almost all cases, it thus was possible to
argue, and perhaps believe, that whatever status a black man or woman held, it was not the
bult of English or colonial law or common law notions oftreedom." !d. at 629; see also Joel R.
l'.llll, Co111ity in International Law, 32 HAKV. lNT'L L. J. I, 5 ( 1991) ( "[Tlhis constellation of
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historically, "f()remost in the construction of [the] legal rationale for
early slavery was a notion of comity. "" 0 However, there arc limits to
comity, and over the centuries, the limits of comity regarding slavery
in England that emanated from domestic policies were clarified and
strengthened.
Several writs could be used to initiate a judicial case to determine
whether a person was under the burden of villeinage. However, "[a]s
the common law presumption in favor of liberty evolved, it became
increasingly difficult to prove that someone was a villein . . . . Over
hundreds of years jurors . . . began to balk at branding anyone a
villein .... The last case involving a villein was decided in 1618 with
a jury verdict favoring the villein. " 51 By the middle of the sixteenth
century, the domestic policy of England had changed and slavery
(including the domestic version of it, villeinage) was strongly
disfavored, and had been abolished de facto though not f()rmally
abolished de jure. Indeed, by the end of that century, "villeinage was
nearly extinct. " 52 As Professor Buckland observed:

ideas about comity-and not merely the narrow classical doctrine--obscures the underlying
political tensions and makes it more ditllcult to address important policy differences among
sovereigns.").

50. Bush, supra note 41, at 627; see alm Paul, supm note 49, at 22 ("Signitic.mtly,
Mansfield, Storv, and Porter all embraced the principle of comitv in connection with the issue
of slavery, the hardest case on which to test any conflicts principle. Comity seemed to be the
only conciliating principle to avoid civil strife. Comity would not compel a tree state to .1pply
the law of a slave state m·er a fugitive slave; neither would comity obligate a sla\-c state to
enforce the law of a tree state over a recaptured fugitive. If comity left no one satisfied, it
seemed to give something to all sides.").
51. See Wise, supra note 37, at 244-45. The elimination of PilleinaJfC slaven· may h,n-c
to do with the growing influence of the MaFna Carta and the importance of liberty to the
identity of Englishmen and to the English political-legal system of rights and government. At
the time of Ratholomcw's Case in the middle of the thirteenth century the Ma,qiJa Carta
(signed June 15, 1215 at Runnymeadc, England) was not vet a half-century old, and it had
been and would continue to be largely ignored by the Tudor monarchv. However, it became
the rallying cry of English constitutionalists during the reign of the Stuarts, and by the middle
of the sixteenth century, the prestige and influence of the Ma,ww Carttl lud grown
significantly, and its basic principles had become more settled in English l.m· and political
philosophy. The Magna Carta, signed by King John to settle the Crown's dispute with a
group of barons, was largely ignored f(>r centuries, through the Tudor period, but slowlv grew
in influence until it became the rallying cry of the Stuart-era constitutionalists. A.E. Dick
Howard, Commentary, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT A:O.:D COMMENTARY 3-4 (rev. ed., Univ. Press
ofVa. 1998).
52. George Van Cleve, Somerset's Case and Its Antaedcnt.l' iu Imperial l'enpcctil'e, 24
L. & HIST. REV. 601,611 (2006).
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l T Jhe strong leaning in bvor of liberty which has marked the
common law ti·om very early times, by encouraging presumptions
of manumission and other pleas which would defeat villein status,
ultimately succeeded in so completely undermining that status that,
as Holdsworth says, "the law of villein status was never repealed. It
simply tell into disuse because the persons to whom it applied had
ceased to exist. " 53
Inversely, as the domestic policy in favor of individual liberty and
emancipation strengthened, the comity doctrine favoring recognition
of slaves from f(xeign jurisdictions became weaker, more restricted,
and subject to more exceptions than it had been earlier. By the
middle of the sixteenth century, it was understood in English law,
and English legal commentators had explicitly noted (though it was
not beyond dispute ), 54 that upon arriving in England, a slave's status
as enslaved would not be recognized or given effect. 55 A line of
commentaries from the mid-seventeenth century onward agree. 56
Thus, three centuries after Bartholomew)s Case, the change in
legal policies concerning recognition of slave status imposed in other
jurisdictions was shown clearly in Cartwright)s Case, decided in Star
Chamber in or about 1567. 57 The brief report notes simply that
"one Cartwright brought a slave from Russia, and would scourge
him, f(x which he was questioned; and it was resolved that England
was too pure an air for slaves to breathe in. " 58 Professor Bush notes
that there is a comity dimension to the Cartwright decision because
"Cartwright can be viewed as reasoning that all slaves in England
were fi·ee, while allowing that slaves [in other jurisdictions] outside
of England, even under English masters, even in English colonies,
need not be." 59 Thus, comity was in the background reminding
Englishmen that most other jurisdictions in the world did not

53. BLTCKI.A:\'D & McNAIR, supra note 33, at 30.
54. Bush, supra note 41, at 610, (citing THOMAS SMITH, DE REI'liBLICA ANGLO RUM§
3 X, at 107 (L. Alston cd., Cambridge U. Press 1906) (1583)).
55. !d. at 611 (citing WII.LIAM HARRISON, THE DESCRIPTION OF ENGLAND !IX
(Georges Edelen eel., 1994) ( 1577) ( "[A]II note of servile bondage is utterly removed.")).
56. Van Cleve, supnz note 52, at 611-12 (citations omitted).
57. Van Cleve says the case was decided in 1569. Van Cleve, supra note 52, at 614.
58. 2 jOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS 468 ( 1680), quoted in I jOHN
C. HL 1 RD, THE LAW 01' FREEDOM ;\ND BONDAGE 1:-.: THE UNITED STATES 179 (photo. reprint
196X) ( 1858), cited iu Bush, supra note 41, at 610 n.34.
59. Bush, .wpra note 41, at 626.
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guarantee the full extent of universal liberty that England did. 611 But
the subordination of comity in Cartwright to the "pure air of
England"-the notion that slavery was incompatible with the strong
domestic policy in England in favor of recognizing the liberty of all
individuals in England-was and remains the critical and the
celebrated, overriding principle of the decision. 61
As a matter of careful briefing, it must be acknowledged that the
legal holding of the case must be read narrowly in the context of the
facts of the dispute. Cartwright)s Case could be read fairly to stand
for no more than the narrow holding that the right of a master to
cruelly beat his slave, even if that is a lawful incident of the legal
status or relationship in the jurisdiction in which the status or
relationship was created, will not be recognized in England in the
face of strong public policy to the contrary. This would suggest a
rather narrow exception to the general rule of comity, and the "pure
air" statement might be dismissed as mere dictum. However, the law
developed in a broader fashion and the Cartwr~qht dictum became
the effective rule oflaw.
The most famous precedent limiting the comity principle came
two centuries later when, in Somerset v. Stewart/' 2 Lord Manstield in
1772 denied that a master could use f(xce to send his slave from
England to Jamaica on the ground that even if African and other
nations might enslave their own peoples, "English colonies were
nowhere authorized to erect novel, extra-legal institutions like
slavery. " 63 The bold decision shows how deeply the idea of individual
60. See Daniel J. Hulse bosch, Sommerset's Case M the Bar: Securi11H the "l'urc Air" of'
English Jurisdiction Within the British Empire, 13 TEX. WESLEYA~ L. REV. 6'}9, 702 (2007)
("English treed om was juxtaposed against colonial slavery [in Somerset's Case]
IThe
contrast] highlighted the balance of governmental powers within England that preserved
liberty, in contrast to the unbalanced executive and discretionary governments that, English
residents believed, characterized the colonies.").
61. Id. at 701-02.
62. Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 49'} (K.B.). More than fifty years later,
however, the English High Court of Admiralty held that if the slave was temporarily in
England and later returned to a slave jurisdiction, the law of England would no longer be in
effect and the status of slavery would return if so authorized under the law of the !attn
jurisdiction. PAUL FINKELMi\N, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD, A BRIEF HISTORY WITH
DOCUMENTS 20-21 (1997) [hereinafter FINKELMA:O.:, DRED SCOTT] (citing The SlaPe, Grace,
2 Hagg. Admir. (G.B.) 94 (1827)); see also PAUL FI:O.:KELMA:O.:, Al\: IMPERI'FC:T lJ:-iiO:O.:,
SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 181-235 ( 1 '}81) [hereinafter FI:O.:KEI.MA:>;, IMPERI'ECI].
See generalZv William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mamjield and the Le._gitimacy of Slapery in the
Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 86 (1975 ).
63. Bush, supra note 41, at 623.
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liberty had become embedded in the fabric of English self-identity:
"England was constituted ideologically-as a place predisposed to
championing personal liberty. " 64 The facts of the case are that
Charles Stewart (or Stuart), a Virginian, 65 bought James Somerset as
a slave from Jamaica. 66 Somerset was an African who had been
enslaved in Africa and transported to Jamaica and then Virginia-all
allegedly jurisdictions where slavery was legal. 67 Stewart purchased
Somerset in Virginia, brought his slave with him to Boston, then to
England on business, intending to return to the Americas. When
Somerset ran away and later was found, Stewart had him forcibly
detained on a ship until Stewart concluded his business and was
ready to return to Jamaica where he planned to sell Somerset. 68
Thanks to alert abolitionists, a petition for writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of Somerset was filed by attorneys acting pro bono. 69 It was
successfully argued on behalf of the slave that "comity does not
require domestic recognition of a foreign rule where great policy
inconvenience would follow, and recognition of foreign slavery
within England would constitute great inconvenience." 70 Lord
Mansfield agreed. The brief report of his opinion, just over 200
words ( unotlicially recorded), informs that Mansfield ruled:
So high an act of dominion must be recognized by the [positive]
law of the country where it is used.
The power of a master over his slave has been extremely different,
in different countries. The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it

64. T.K. Hunter, Traniatlantic Ne,_qotiatiorts: Lord Mansfield, Liberty and Somerset, 13
TEX. WESLEY A~ L. REV. 711, 712 (2007); id. at 713 ("While strictly speaking, English soil did
not automatically confer or restore a slave's freedom, the characterization of England's soil by
Englishmen themselves as 'tree' meant that the presence of a person who challenged his/her
continued state of bondage stood in tension with that description-a characterization that was
an integral part of common bw.").
65. ~INKELMAN, IMPERFECT, supra note 62, at 39.
66. The report of Mansfield's ruling spells the slave's name with both one "m" and two.
~or .1 review of the bets and significance of the case, see Hunter, supra note 64, at 712
(spelling the Virginian's name as "Steuart"). See also id. at 714 (noting that Stuart was a
customs otticcr who bought Somerset in Virginia, took him to Boston, then to London).
67. I d. at 720 (citing Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 499). Regarding the legality of slavery in
Africa, sec infra note 96.
68. Hunter, Iupra note 64, at 714-16.
69. Van Cleve, supra note 52, at 625.
70. Bush, supra note 41, at 623.
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is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political;
but only by positive law ....
fllt's so odious, that nothing can be suHered to support it, but
. . 1aw .... 71
posltlve

Regarding comity toward another sovereign or the law of another
jurisdiction, Mansfield further reasoned, "Whatever inconveniences,
thercf(xe, may follow from the decision, I cannot say this case is
allowed or approved by the law of England; and therefore the black
must be discharged. " 72
Thus, Mansfield invoked four limiting principles to contain and
circumvent the comity doctrine in the case of slavery: ( l) the
principle of vindicating the overriding public policy of the local
forum, despite "inconveniences" that may result tor the law or atE1irs
in another jurisdiction, (2) the principle that despite (or because of)
the wide variety of laws regarding the status and incidents of slavery,
no sovereign is required by comity to create a controversial domestic
relationship unknown or disallowed in its own territory , 73 ( 3) the
principle that the positive law of the realm controls the recognition
issue (inviting Parliament to legislate to settle the issue)/ 4 and (4)
the controlling principle that even if the foreign status of slavery
were recognized under conflicts principles prevailing at the time,
England need not and would "not recognize the 'incidents' of that
status that were considered 'inconvenient' or penal in the forum
jurisdiction. " 75
Historically, Somerset may not have changed the law very much/ 6
and it may actually have decided less than it came to stand f()r. 77

71. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510. Counsel t(Jr Somerset also repeated the "pure air"
statement of the opinion in CartJPri;_qht's Case. Hulsebosch, supm note 60, at 699.
72. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510 (emphasis added).
73. Jd. at 620-27.
74. Hulscbosch, supm note 60, at 705. !vbnsticld's decision in Somenct's Case
"signal[ ed] to Parliament that legislation was needed .., ld. at 706. He wished "to make the
House of Commons and the common-law courts the ct:ntn of imperial gm·enuncc at the
expense of the king." !d.
75. Jd.at704.
76. Professor Van Cleve asserts that "Lord Mansfield's contlict of la\\·s analysis, his
rejection of chattel slavery, and his continuation of 'ncar slavery' in Srmursct were rclativch·
predictable under earlier law . . ." Van Cleve, supm note 52, at 604. lntcrestingh·, Lord
Manstield decided a vcrv similar case while the Somerset case was being tried (over months).
libcr~Hing a slave under an entirely different doctrine (that the relationship of slavcrv had been
ruptured when master and slaver were captured by a Spanish privateer). Hunter, mpm note 64.
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l-listorian George Van Cleve asserts that Somerset would not have
been set at liberty in England, but would have had a "ncar slavery"
status of lite-indentured servitude in England.n
Most courts and legal authorities during this petiod [ 1540-17701
\vere in broad agreement that: first, the common law did not
recognize classical chattel slavery in England; second, the status of
slaves who came to England was governed by English law; third,
slaves who came to England were no longer subject to chattel
slavery, but were not fully emancipated; they were held to a lesser
but substantial torm of "slavish servitude" that constituted "near
slavery." 79

Lord Mansfield clearly did not forbid all recogmt1on of fc>reign
slave status in England, nor did he outlaw slavery in England. 80
Professor Hulsebosch notes that "in the years after Somerset
Manstlcld repeatedly stated that his decision did not end the
servitude of slaves in England and did not aHect slavery anywhere
else in the British Empire. " 81
Likewise, the actual holding of Somerset)s Case, read narrowly in
the context of the facts, was only that one particular incident of the

at 716-17 (discussing Rex v. Stapylton ( 1771 ), reprinted in 2 )MIES 0LJ1HAM, THF
MANSfiELD MANllSCRII'TS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGI.ISH LAW IN THE Fil;rJTEE:--ITH
CENTURY, 1225-26, 1242-43 (Univ. ofN.C. Press 1992)).
77. See I:'INKEI.MAN, IMPERFECT, mpra note 62, at 38 ("Just exacth· what Somerset
decided is still being debated, over two hundred years after Lord Mansfield's opinion.").
78. Van Ckve, supra note 52, at 604, 634.
79. !d. at 614.
80. Sarah H. Cleveland, Forei._qn Authority, American Exccptionalism, and the Dred
Scott CaSt', 82 CHI-KENT L. REV. 393,402 (2007) ("The decision itself did not outlaw sbverv
in England, but it established that English law would not protect enslaved status on English
soil .... The decision held instead that the status of slavery was not recognized and would not
be enforced in England."); Hunter, supra note 64, at 720 ("Was slavery legitimate in England?
It \\',1S ,1 question Mansfield dared not answer. And so, quite simply, he didn't."); id. at 721
("Lord Mansfield did not proclaim that all slavery was at an end or that every master who
brought his or her slave into England would immediately have the slave declared tree by the
law. The Chief justice only ruled on the literal matter at hand which was the summary
detention of James Somerset and the prospect of him being taken from the country against his
will .... ").
81. Hulse bosch, supm note 60, at 70 I. He also intriguingly argues that one controlling
consideration that shaped the decision was Mansfield's desire to strengthen the jurisdiction of
the courts and the power of Parliament to decide such matters, rather than reinforce the power
of the King and his ministers to determine such questions. !d. at 706-09. Somerset "reflected
Mansfield's desire to make the House of Commons and the common-law courts the center of
imperial governance at the expense of the king and Privy Council, colonial governors, and the
West India lobby." ld. at 706.
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master-slave relationship, the master's right to forcibly compel a slave
to leave England and return to slave jurisdiction to be sold, would
not be recognized in England in the absence of positive law so
compelling and in the face of strong public policy in favor of
protecting individual liberty. Thus, Mansfield himself later indicated
that Somerset "only determined that a Master cannot by force carry
his Slave out of England. " 82
Nevertheless, the Somerset decision could be read more broadly,
and it was-especially by abolitionists. 83 By definitively rejecting the
notion that slavery can be based on natural law or common law
principles, and suggesting that it can exist only where allowed by the
positive law, Mansfield laid the foundation for the eradication of
slavery. 84 Somerset quickly came to stand for the notion that there
was an exception to the principle of inter-jurisdictional comity for
slave status and incidents. Somerset was immediately and immensely
influential and had wide and enormous effects outside of the courts.
The case was widely reported in both England and in the American
colonies. 85 "At least thirteen British newspapers-and twenty-two
out of twenty-four North American colonial newspapers sampled by
Bradley-reported the arguments or decision. " 86 "The 'pure air'
remark [of counsel] helped galvanize the [abolitionist]

82. Van Cleve, supra note 52, at 634 (quoting recently discovered report, R. v.
Inhabitants of Thames Ditton, in Abbot MS report) (alteration in original), transcription in
Appendix
2
of Van
Cleve,
m
online
version,
available
at
http://
www.historycooperative.org/journals/lhr/24.3/clevc.html#REF208; see also Hulsebosch,
supra note 60, at 701-03; James Oldham, New Light on Mansfield and SlaJ,ery, 27 J. BRJT.
STUD. 45 (1988).
83. Despite Mansfield's arguably narrow holding, abolitionists read the decision
broadly; and eventually their broad reading of the case prevailed and helped to accelerate the
spread and speed of the eradication of slavery.
84. Van Cleve, supra note 52, at 643 ("By the late eighteenth century, the English
Crown has limited legal authority to govern the colonies without Parliament's acquiescence;
therefore, Mansfield's creation of a positive law framework for slavery in the context of rising
abolitionist sentiment laid the groundwork for Parliamentary control of colonial slavery."); see
also ROBERT COVER, JuSTICE ACCUSED, ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 87
( 1975) ("The broad language in Somerset's Case was more important t(Jr its ideological than for
its practical effect.").
85. Hunter reports that not long after the court ruled against him in Somerset, Stewart
received a letter from a friend informing him that his (the triend's) slave had run away: "He
told the Servants that he had rec'd (sic] a letter from his Uncle Sommerset (sic] acquainting
him that Lord Manstleld had given them their freedom .... "Hunter, supra note 64, at 72425.
86. Van Cleve, supra note 52, at 625 n.ll9.
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movement.
. Almost immediately, slaves and abolitionists
throughout the British Empire interpreted the Somerset decision as
abolishing slavery in England and, possibly, as endangering slavery
across the Empire. "~ 7
However, as a matter of law, apart from and arguably even more
important than Somerset's impact on the general public's perception
(or misperception) of the domestic law of slavery, was the impact of
Mansfield's opinion upon choice of law doctrine in slavery
recognition cases. By expanding and reinforcing the limits to the
claim of comity for recognition of slavery, and by upholding the local
public policy against that disfavored domestic status against the
comity claims for recognition of the domestic status of chattel
slavery, even as applied to slaves just temporarily visiting England,
Manstleld established the framework for cont1icts analysis of slavery
in both English and American courts for the next century.
Somerset cited Cartwright as precedent for what today would be
called the public policy exception to the general rule of comity for
inter-jurisdictional recognition of slavery status. Cartwright, thus,
paved the way f(x and laid the foundation of the influential Somerset)s
Case.~ 8 Sergeant Davy, representing the slave Somerset, quoted from
Cartright)s Case to support his claim that by setting foot in England,
Somerset had become emancipated from his status as a chattel slave,
because the very "Soil the Air of England ... makes this [a] part of
our Constitution." 8 ~
Clearly, long before the American Revolution, English courts
detlnitively aftlrmed that the local forum's sovereign's rejection (or
lack of positive law approval) of the controversial domestic
relationship status of chattel slavery prevailed over the countervailing
principle of international comity when it came to slaves imported

87. Hulsebosch, ..-upra note 60, at 701.
88. See Bush, mpra note 41, at 626 ("It is no coincidence that many of the major
European powers, all deeply invoh·ed in slavetrading and plantation building, generated legal
cases or edicts with 'tree air' reasoning similar to Cartwri_qht's, and that nowhere did 'tree air'
reasoning lead to speedv emancipation . . . . The 'free air' message was picked up by Chief
justice Holt in a series of cases around 1700 .... "). Examples of the series of cases are cited at
id. at note 84: Smith v. Brown & Cooper, Holt 495, 90 Eng. Rep. 1172, 2 Salk. 666, 91 Eng.
Rep. 566 (Q.B. 1702); Smith v. Gould, 2 Ld. Raym. 1274,92 Eng. Rep. 338,2 Salk. 666,91
Eng. Rep. 567 (Q.B. 1706).
89. Van Cleve, supra note 52, at 627 (quoting HENRY MARCHANT, DIARY (R.I.
Historical Society MS) 1771-72).
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into England, at least as to incidents if not entirely as to status. 90
Blackstone, writing two decades before the U.S. Constitution vvas
drafted and a decade before the War of Independence, summarized
the primacy of domestic policy over comity:
[T]he law of England abhors, and will not endure, the existence of
slavery within this nation .... And now it is laid down, [ J that a
slave or negro, the instant he lands in England, becomes a freeman;
that is, the law will protect him in the enjoyment of his person, and
91
.
l11s property.

2. The evolution of the recognition offoreign slaves in American
conflicts jurisprudence
Because of its novel federal composition, and because of strongly
held, starkly divergent public policies concerning slavery embodied
in the domestic laws of the different states, the United States of
America was a fertile breeding ground f(x inter-jurisdictional
conflicts over recognition of slavery during the first eight decades of
national existence. The differences in internal domestic policies
concerning slavery among the American states were sharp to begin
with (sometimes polar-opposite), and they continued to grow
throughout this long period of early and adolescent nationhood. "By
1787 slavery was being abolished or had already been ended in six
states north of the Mason-Dixon line [Massachusetts, New
Hampshire,
Vermont,
Connecticut,
Rhode
Island,
and
Pennsylvania]. " 92 However, slavery was legal and widely practiced in
the remaining seven states. By 1860, nearly seventy-five years later,
slavery remained legal in fifteen states, the District of Columbia, and
some territories, 93 while slavery had been abolished in the other

90. See, eg., Bush, supra note 41, at 622-27; Van Cleve, mpm note 52, at 625-36.
91. BLACKSTO;\;E, supra note 31, at *424. Id. at *423 ("Pure and proper slav-crv docs
not, nav cannot, subsist in England .... l I Jndeed, it is repugnant to reason, and the principles
of natural law .... "); see also id. at * 104.
92. fiNKELMAN, IMPERFECT, supra note 62, at 45.
93. Slavery was legal in Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kcntuckv, Tennessee, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Teus, Arkansas,
and Missouri, and was permitted in the District of Columbia and some of the territories
including what is now Oklahoma, Nebraska, Utah, Colorado, Nevada, and ;\;ew !'vkxico.
World Book: Encyclopedia and Learning Resources, Civil War, Geographic Divide,
http://www.worldbook.com/wb/Students?contcnt_spotlight/ civil_war/ geographic
(last
visited jan. 8, 2009); A Biography of America, I 0, The Coming of the Civil War,
http://www.learncr.org/biographyobmerica/prog I 0/maps/ (last visited jan. 8, 200') ).
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nineteen states and other federal territories. 94 Thus, interstate
conflicts over recognition of slaves and slavety were inevitable and
frequent. As the internal policy differences widened-the free states
became more abolitionist while the slave states became more
determinedly protective of slavety-interstate recognition conflicts
became sharper and more volatile.
The evolution of inter-jurisdictional recognition of slavety in
America followed the same general pattern and trajectory established
in England in Bartholomew's Case, Cartright)s Case, and Somerset)s
Case. The decisions in the northern states moved from stronger
comity to weaker comity as internal domestic policy moved from
mild opposition to slavery to strong opposition to slavery. Thus,
American courts generally applied the principle of comity except and
until it conflicted with and was subordinated to strong local public
policy.
In American courts during this period, as in England earlier,
comity was the dominant (but not absolute) principle and it
supported the recognition of foreign slaves. According to Hurd's
influential nineteenth-century American treatise on slavery, slavery
was a matter of comity given to a legal status imposed by a foreign
sovereign. 95 No less a jurist than John Marshall invoked the doctrine
of international comity in 1825 to justifY ordering the return of
scores of slaves to their Spanish master in The Antelope. 96 In addition,

Eleven of the fifteen slave states seceded and joined the Confederacy (excluding Delaware,
Marl'iand, Kentuch, and Missouri).
94. lvbine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New
York, New jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, vVisconsin, Minnesota,
K.msas, loW<l, Oregon, and Calif(mlia, as well as Washington Territory. See World Book, supra
note <)3.
95. I )OH:-; C<mMAN HURD, THE LAW Of fREEDOM A:-lD BONDA<3E IN THE UNITED
ST,-\H.S 104--05, § 114 ( 18S8).
96. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (I 0 Wheat.) 66, 122-23 ( 1825 ).
No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect
cqualitv of nations .... As no nation can prescribe a rule f(Jr others, none can make
a law of nations; and this I sbve J traftic remains lawful to those whose governments
h.1ve not f(Jrbiddcn it.
It fdlmvs, that .1 f(Jrcign vessel engaged in the African slave trade, captured on
the high-seas in time of peace, by an American cruiser, and brought in for
adjudication, would be restored.
!d. Thus, Marshall ordered that between 93 and 166 slaves (determination of the correct
number was lcti f(Jr the trial court) be restored to the Spanish ship owner who had purchased
them, and fi·om whom they were taken bd(Jre being seized on the Antelope. Id. at 126-27.
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comity accepted and facilitated the recogmt10n, and thus the
extension, of slavery. "[G]iven the presence of slave jurisdictions in a
mixed federal union, comity by its nature tended to be a proslavery
argument, supporting at least the main workings of fugitive
rendition. As a result, comity became a typical feature of proslavery
legal polemics .... " 97
The American reliance on comity was not constitutionally
required. Apart from the narrow subject of fugitive slaves, 98 nothing
in the Constitution of the United States required any state to
recognize the domestic status or relationship of slavery imposed
upon an individual by another state. There is no contemporary
whisper or shadow of suggestion that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause was understood to oblige any state to recognize or enforce
slave status imposed in another state, 99 and nothing else in the text of
the Constitution hints at any such obligation upon the states. 100 And
while "[ t ]he hastily drafted and accepted Fugitive Slave Clause [may
have] proved the most vexatious, if not the most important, part of
the Constitution directly bearing on slavery,"HH it dealt with only a
very small and discrete aspect of interstate slavery conflicts issues

It is a mark of how inviting comity was as a doctrine, and perhaps how hollow the
alleged respect was for African sovereignty, that Marshall stepped back from
requiring bona t!de slave status in Africa. Instead, by accepting a presumption rather
than actual proof of African sla\·e status and by placing the burden of proof on those
Africans who would assert freedom, he allowed for unproven and even erroneous
enslavement.
Bush, supra note 41, at 622 n.7l. SeelJenerally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE ANTELOPE: THE
ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED AFRJCA."'S IN THE ADMI:--:ISTRATIONS Of ]AMES MONROE At--iD
JOHN QUINCY ADAM:S (1977).
97. Bush, supra note 41, at 622; see also Joel R. Paul, Comity in International LaJV, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. I, 5 ( 1991) ("The classical [comity] doctrine developed in the United States
where it was introduced in large part to avoid confrontation between free and slave states.").
98. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9 (Fugitive Slave Clause).
99. FINKELMAN, IMPERfECT, supra note 62, at 33 ("If the Full Faith and Credit Clause
was meant to give legal recognition to slavery in nonslave states, it is likely that the southerners
at the convention would have said something to that ctkct. The debates in the state
conventions provide even less help in interpreting the clause.").
100. The Privileges and Immunities Clause, which required states to give local privileges
to nonresidents, did not compel interstate comity. See FINKELMAN, IMPERfECT, supra note 62,
at 33-34.
101. FINKELMAN, IMPERfECT, supra note 62, at 26. This clause was proposed less than
three weeks before the Philadelphia Convention adjourned and adopted with little debate and
without a f(>rmal vote. ld. at 26-27; see also ]AMES MADISON, NOTES Of THE DEBATES 01' THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 545-54 (Proceedings of Aug. 28-29, 17R9).
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(involving the return of stolen "property"). 102 Thus, the
Constitution did not compel interstate recognition of slavery in any
other context except fugitive or runaway slaves.
Moreover, the Founders, both Federalists and Anti-Federalists,
emphasized and celebrated the fact that the national government had
no power to directly regulate domestic relations under the
Constitution. 103 The principle of federalism in family law-that
family law falls within the residual sovereign power of the states-has
been recognized since 1787. 104 As the Supreme Court expressly
acknowledged in 1890: "The whole subject of the domestic relations
of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
states, and not to the laws of the United States." 105 Thus, the
constitutional principle of federalism in family law did not compel
comity in conflicts involving interstate recognition of slavery.
While nothing in the text or basic principles of the Constitution
mandated comity, or compelled or prohibited interstate recognition
of slaves or slavery status by sister states, the authority to resolve the
conflict-of-laws issues is provided in the Constitution. The Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Constitution gives Congress "by general
Laws [the authority to] prescribe the Manner in which [the] Acts,

102. FINKELMAN, IMPERfECT, supra note 62, at 27 ("At the time ... fugitive slaves were
only a minor concern
.. "). For a thorough discussion of American fugitive slave cases
generally, and the final Supreme Court decision on fugitive slaves in particular, sec Earl M.
Maltz, Slavery, Federalism, and the Constitution: Ableman v. Booth and the Struggle Over
Fugitive Slaves, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 83 (2008).
103. Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 17
YALE J.L. & FEMI:-<ISM 221, 226 (2005) (citing Federalist Papers by Madison and Hamilton).
104. See, eg., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) ("[D]omestic relations ... has
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States. Cases decided by this Court
over a period of more than a century bear witness to this historical fact."); Barber v. Barber, 62
U.S. 582, 584 (1858) ("We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United
States upon the subject of divorce . . . . "); id. at 602 (Daniel, J., dissenting) ("The Federal
tribunals can have no power to control the duties or the habits of the different members of
private families in their domestic intercourse. This power [to regulate domestic relations]
belongs exclusively to the particular communities of which those families form parts, and is
essential to the order and to the very existence of such communities."). See generally Wardle,
supra note 103.
105. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). As recently as 2004 the Court
powerfully reaHirmed the constitutional primacy of state law in regulating matters of domestic
relations. Elk Grove Unitled Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12-13 (2004) (reviewing
precedents for federalism in family law and noting: "So strong is our deference to state law in
this area that we have recognized a 'domestic relations exception' that 'divests the tederal
courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees."' (quoting Ankenbrandt
v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,703 (1992))).
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Records and Proceedings [of other States] shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof. " 106 Since 1789, Congress has had the power under
this Clause to adopt a choice of law rule mandating strict adherence
to a strong comity rule of interstate recognition of slavery, or, on the
other hand, absolutely barring interstate recognition of slavery, or
some other position. But Congress did not use this power to address
the issue of interstate recognition of slavery. The general Full Faith
and Credit statute, adopted by the First Congress in 1790 107 and
"essentially unchanged [in] form since its enactment just after the
ratification of the Constitution," 108 remained the sole congressional
rule during this time of interstate conflicts concerning recognition of
slaves and slavery. 109 It simply provided that, in relevant part, "the
records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any State ... shall
have such faith and credit given to them in every court of the United
States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from
whence the records are, or shall be taken. " 110 It did not address the
interstate slavery-recognition issue at all. Congress chose not to
exercise its authority to enact a controlling choice of law rule either
f()r civil cases generally or specifically for slave-recognition cases. 111 In
short, neither federal constitutional law nor federal statutory lavv

106. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ I.
107. ActofMav26, 1790,ch.ll, I Stat.l22:
That the acts of the I .egisbtures of the several States shall be authenticated lw
having the seal of their respective States aHixed thereto; that the recorch and judicial
proceedings of the courts of any State shall be proved or admitted in anv other court
within the United States bv attestation of the clerk, and the sc.1l of the court
.mnexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the judge, chief justice, or
presiding magistrate, as the case may be, that the said attestation is in due ft>nll. And
the s.1id records and judicial proceedings shall have such faith and credit given to
them in every court of the United States, as they h<l\'e by law or usage in the courts
of the State fi·om whence the records arc, or shall be taken.
This Act is now codified at 2X U.S. C. § 173X.
lOX. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,96 n.X ( 19XO).
109. The subsequent supplementary re-enactment, by Act of Mar. 27, IX04, ch. 56, 2
Stat. 29X-299, did not extend the dutv to give the same faith and credit to state "Acts" of the
legislature of any state (choice of law), either. Congress did not get around to <ldding "Acts"
(choice of law) to the l'ull bith and Credit statute until the re1·ision of 194X. Act of June 25,
194X, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 947 § 173X.
110. Act of May 26, I 790 (emphasis added).
Ill. Sec Httterally H.1rold ! .. Korn, The [)epclojmtmt of' Judicial Jurisdiction in tile United
States: Part I, 65 BROOK. 1.. REV. 935, 962 ( 1999); Ralph U. Whitten, ·171e Cm1.rtitutirma/
1-imitatiml.f mt State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historiall-Interpntatipe Reexamination of' t!JC Full
Ftlith and Cn:dit and Due l'rocess Clauses (/'art One), 14 CREil:HTON !.. RE\'. 499, SSO-S.)
(19Xl ).
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mandated the application of the pro-slavery-recognition comity
principle in interstate slave-recognition cases.
The American reliance on comity in inter-jurisdictional slaverecognition cases derived primarily from English private international
law precedents. The cont1ict of laws principles underlying the English
decisions were generally acknowledged and followed in the American
colonies and in most of the American states. Inter-jurisdictional
slave-recognition cases in America followed the same general
principles articulated by Mansfield in Somerset and encapsulated by
Blackstone. Their general statements and summaries of the English
understanding of the international law of inter-jurisdictional
recognition of slavery were the basic, and generally the dominant (if
inconsistently and imperfectly f(>llowed), position of the law in the
American colonies and in the independent American states. 112
Although modern legal historians may fault Blackstone and
Mansfield f(Jr distorting some precedents and suggesting over-broad
conclusions, 113 in the nineteenth -century American legal system these
English authorities had wide acceptance and persuasive int1uence. 114
Thus, the British rule of comity with significant exceptions ret1ecting
principles of natural law and dominant internal domestic policy
became the general rule f()llowed in the northern states in interstate
slave-recognition cases, as well as in many of the slave states. 115
As noted by Professor Cover, "[ d Juring the critical decade of the
1780s, it was almost axiomatic that the operation of normal

112. Sa tiN KELMAN, IMPEKI'ECJ', .rupm note 62, at 101-RO.
113. Sa, CJf., Van Cleve, .rupra note 52, at 635-42.
114. Sec .wpm note X6 (noting the wide newspaper dissemination of Somer.ret case);
Bernard C. Steiner, 'J'hc Adoption of'EIIJf[i.rh Law i11 Marvland, X YALE L.). 353, 355-56 (May
I X99) (explaining 11lackstonc 's intlumcc in c.uly American legal history). The Supreme Court
has observed then: "Blackstone's Commentaries arc accepted as the most satis[lctory exposition
of the common law of England." Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904).
Blackstone's discussion of the rights of persons was published only eleven years hcfc>rc the
Declar.nion of Independence and w.1s quickly embraced and widely read in the American
colonies. Burke commented: "I hear that [booksellers] have sold ncar!\' as many of
Blackstone's 'Commcnt.lries' in America as in England." Edmund 11urkc, Speech on
Concili.nion with the Colonies (March 22, 1775 ), repriuted in THE ESSENTIAL BILL OF
RIC!lTS 170, 173 ( (3ordon Llovd & Margie !.loyd cds., 199/l ).
115. Sa, e.•q., Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. 569, 59R (La. I X27) ("11y the laws of this
countrv, sl.wcrv is pcrmil'ted, .md the rights of the master can be cnfc>rced. Suppose the
individual subject to it is carried to England or Mclssachusctts;---would their courts sustain the
argument that his st.1te or condition was tixed by the laws of his domicile of origin? We know,
they would not."). l'or a useful description of some of the major slavery c1ses in American
jurisprudence, sec generally PAUl. l'J~KF.l.M:\N, S!.AVERY I~ Tl!E COURTROOM ( !9R5 ).
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'international' reciprocity would not lead to the recognition by one
state of the slave property of another. " 116 for example, one argument
for ratification of the Constitution in the South was, as Madison
argued in Virginia, that it contained the fugitive Slave Clause,
without which runaway slaves would not be returned. 117 Similarly,
the state of Pennsylvania considered it necessary to pass a special law
to allow congressmen to keep slaves in the nation's capital (then
Philadelphia), implying that without such special immunity
Pennsylvania would apply its domestic law to the slaves'
emancipation. 118
In the free states, courts initially recognized the distinction
between bringing a slave into the state and bringing the institution
of slavery into the state. As a general rule in the North, "state judges
often determined that the mere transit through a free state would
not free a slave. " 119 (There were rare exceptions where local policy
against slavery was especially strong; for example, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court in 1836 followed the Somerset)s Case's absolute rule
and held that slaves became emancipated the moment they entered
into the state. )120 However, "all northern state supreme courts
agreed that it was a violation of free-state law if a master allowed a
slave to work in a free state, particularly if the master hired the slave
out."l21
This transitory-permanent dichotomy was also the prevailing rule
in the South, until shortly before the Civil War. "Courts in Missouri,
Kentucky, and Louisiana continued to free slaves who had lived or
worked in tree jurisdictions. Well after Slave Grace, the Missouri
courts continued to liberate slaves who had lived in the North." 122

116. COVER, supra note 84, at 88; see also id. at 87-91 (reviewing Glses from the era
indicating that the natural right to liberty would override comity).
117. Id. at 88.

118. Id.
119. FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT, supra note 62, at 17.
120. Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 217 (1836) (discussed in
FINKELMAN, IMPERFECT, supra note 62 at 105-08).
121. FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT, supra note 62, at 17.
122. Id. at 21; see also COVER, supra note 84, at 97 (Kentucky, Louisiana, and Missouri
led the South in recognizing emancipation by residence in free states). See, cp., Rankin \'.
Lydia, 9 Ky. 467, 478 ( 1820) (recognizing emancipation by fixed residence in a tree state, but
not by mere temporary sojourn).
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Bef(xe 1830, only in one state, Pennsylvania, "was even the
slightest restriction placed on interstate transit." 123 There, a 1780 law
emancipated slaves six months after they arrived in the state. 124 Over
the next fifty years, that Pennsylvania rule was expanded, due in no
small part to a litigation campaign waged by abolitionists, until, by
1830, "only bona fide travelers and exempt public officials could still
bring their slaves into the state [without having them
emancipatedJ." 125 In 1847, the Pennsylvania legislature repealed the
six-month period, making automatic emancipation the rule, as it was
in England. 126
In other non-slave states, however, adoption of the alleged
Cartwri;Jht-Somerset rejection of the sojourner principle in favor of
immediate emancipation from chattel slavery instantly upon entry
into the jurisdiction took a little longer to become fully accepted.
Until then it could be argued that comity to sister slave states or,
more likely, hospitable notions of courtesy to citizens of slave states
traveling in the north with their slaves, tempered application of the
instant emancipation rule. 127
However, a more powerful reason that most northern states did
not immediately apply the "pure air," instant-emancipation, broadreading-of- Cartwri;Jht-Somerset rule to slaves in the case of visitors,
transients, sojourners, immune ofi1cials, and other temporary
circumstances was not because strict adherence to comity took
precedence over internal domestic relations policies in the northern
states. 128 Rather, it was because the internal policies of those states

123. l:'I~KELIV!A~, DRED SCOTT, supra note 62, at 21.
124. ld. at 47-48 (citing I LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 492-96
( 1810) ). A 1788 amendment clarified that if the slave owner intended to make Pennsylvania
his residence, emancipation of slaves occurred immediately. I d.
125. !d. at 52. The litigation is described id. at 50-69. Pennsylvania's aggressive abolition
movement engineered passage of an 1826 Act intended to free Negroes captured as runaways
in the state, which was struck down twenty-two years later by the Supreme Court of the
United Stattos in an opinion by justice Story, in Pri_qq v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539
( 1842).
126. l:'INKEL!viAN, DRED SC:OTT, supra note 62, at 69.
127. In the other northern states, "before the 1830s no slaves were freed solely on the
basis of transit or sojourn." FINKELMAN, l!vii'ERfECT, supra note 62, at 70.
128. On this point, Proti:ssor Finkelman sees comity as the controlling principle in the
1-\orth until 1830, and he sees a later change to give precedence to local, internal anti-slavery
policv. See FINKELMAN, IMPERl'ECT, supra note 62, at 20-100. I agree as to the later policy
but, as explained in the text, think the earlier cases also can be explained in terms of giving
priori tv to internal domestic policies of gradual emancipation.
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were still unsettled; they were or, until recently, had been in the
process of gradual emancipation. Thus, it was a matter of applying to
non-residents, the same loose, "gradual emancipation" anti-slavery
policy that was, in fact, the internal domestic policy of most northern
states. 129 If lingering slavery was internally allowed for residents
during the period of gradual emancipation (f()f example, during the
"grandfather" period when new slavery was not permitted, but old
slave-relations were protected and recognized), insisting on a strict
rule of immediate emancipation for slaves brought into the
jurisdiction temporarily was not required to protect local policy
either logically or morally. Refusal to emancipate the slaves of
temporary visitors was, in fact, an application of the conflicts rule
that the same internal, domestic policy or privilege should apply to
non-residents as to residents. Thus, the amount of comity given to
the foreign status of slavery in the northern states (and expected by
southerners bringing their slaves with them to v1s1t those
jurisdictions) was inversely commensurate with the strength of the
internal public policy banning slavery, as it had been for centuries in
England.
Moreover, this approach was not entirely dissimilar to that
followed in England after the Somerset decision. In 1827 in The
Slave, Grace, 130 the admiralty court distinguished Somerset's rejection
of the sojourner rule and held that if a slave who had resided in
England returned with her master to a slave jurisdiction, she lost her
emancipation and her domestic (slave) status was again determined
by the law of the slave jurisdiction. 131
By the 1830s, as gradual emancipation matured with the passage
of time into complete emancipation (with the death or emancipation
of the old slaves) in the free states, their policy toward recognition of
slaves coming into the state also changed. "Starting in Massachusetts
and
spreading to almost all of the
North,
masters

129. See, ceq., id. at 71-76 (describing New York gradual emancipation laws); id. ,lt 7677 (describing New Jersey gradual emancipation); id. C~t 77-79 (describing graduc1l
emancipation in New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine, where thnc c1re kw cases and less
evidence of comity); id. at 79-82 (describing gradual emancipation in Rhode Island,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut); id. at 82-98 (describing gradual emancipation in Northwest
Ordinance territories of Ohio, MichigC~n, lndianC~, and Illinois).
130. Rex v. Allan (The SlaPe, Grace), (1827) 166 Eng. Rep 179 (Admir.). Sec
1'1NKELMAN, IMPERfECT, supra note 62 at 181-235; Cleveland, mpm note 80, at 402-03.
131. 'JfJe SlaPe, Grace, 166 Eng. Rep. ar 189.
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\VeJT ... denied even limited transit with slavcisl ... ." 132 Thus, by
or bcf()rc 1850 most non-slave states tillly accepted and applied the
broad-reading, "pure air," immediate-emancipation reading of
Somerset's Case and rejected the sojourner exception to instant
emancipation. 1.n Local internal domestic anti-slavery policy of
emancipation was applied to determine the status of all foreign slaves
(except runaway fi1gitives) who entered the northern states, even if
they were in the state only briefly. 134
This change in policy caused enormous friction between the
North and the South. 135 The Southern States cried foul, arguing that
the Northern States had abandoned the historic sojourner rule and
become more rigidly abolitionist. In fact, the Northern States were
continuing to apply the same conflict of laws principle as beforethat comity would be given to the foreign status of slavery to the
extent to which it was consistent with the internal public policy
banning slavery. When slavery became totally eradicated internally in
domestic law and tact, that conflicts principle left no room f()r any
principled recognition of foreign slavery, even for slaves only
temporarily in the state.
This rejection of the sojourner exception to emancipation
reached its most provocative political point in Lemmon v. The People
ex rei. Napoleon, 1?.o in which a family ofVirginia slave-owners moving
to Texas with their eight slaves took a boat from Virginia to New
York City where they transferred to a ship headed directly to New
Orleans. While in transit briefly in New York City, a black dock
worker obtained a writ of habeas corpus and in 1852 the New York
trial court ruled that under New York law, the eight slaves became
free the instant their owner brought them into the state. 137 An
intermediate appellate court upheld the ruling, 138 as did the New

132. FINKEL~IA>I, !l'v!PERFECT, suprtr note 62, at I 00.
133. Of the "tree states" in the North, East, and West, after about 1840, only Calit(Jrnia,
New Jersey, and Illinois showed any continuing tolerance for slaves in transit. Id. at 146, 179.
134. Sa !ff1ltrt!ll1' id. at 101-80. The reaction in the South included acceptance of the
e.1rlicr-rcjected rule of The Slm•c, ( ;rtue in southern courts, resulting in re-enslavcment or
denial of emancipation to Blacks who had lived in the North (not merely visited there), and
resort to !Cdcral law, The l'ugitive Slave Acts and Fugitive Slave Clause, seeking broad
interpretation of positive law to protect slave-owning rights in other states. I d. at 179-235.
13S. Sa ,qcllcm/ly l'INKLEMA>I, IMI'ERH'Cr, mpm note 62, at I() 1-312.
136. 20 0/.Y. 562 ( 1860).
137. The People, ex rd. Lewis Napoleon v. Lemmon, 5 Sand. Ch. 681 (N.Y. Ch. 1852).
138. Lemmon v. The People, 26 Barb. Ch. 270 (N.Y. Ch.1857).
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York Court of Appeals in 1860. 139 The case was headed f(>r the U.S.
Supreme Court (the Taney Court) when it was derailed by the
events leading up to the Civil War. 140
Joseph Story confirmed the rejection of comity regarding slavery
during the height of the slavery crisis in American history, in his
landmark English language treatise on Conflict of Laws:
We know, how this point has been settled in England. It has been
decided, that the law of England abhors, and will not endure the
existence of slavery within the nation; and consequently, as soon as
a slave lands in England, he becomes ipso facto a freeman, and
discharged from the state of servitude. Independent of the
provisions of the constitution of the United States, f(>r the
protection of the rights of masters in regard to domestic fugitive
slaves, there is no doubt, that the same principle pervades the common
law of the non slave holdinJf states in America; that is, (orei._qn sfapes
would no longer be deemed such after their remr}])al thither. 141

Story described the obligation of comity as "imperfect" and not
required when the foreign status or laws "arc deemed oppressive or
injurious to the rights or interests of the inhabitants of the latter, or
where their moral character is questionable, or their provisions
impolitic." 142 Thus, while the general rule of international comity
was that personal capacity or incapacity was to be governed by the
law of the domicile of the individual, this was subject, wrote Story,
to the general exception that:
Personal disqualifications not arising from the law of nature, but
from the principles of the customary or positive law of a foreign
country, and especially such as arc of a penal nature, arc not
generally regarding in other countries, where the like
disqualifications do not exist .... So the state of slavery will not be

139. 20 N.Y. 562 ( 1860).
140. FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT, supra note 62, at 4\1.
141. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 92-\13, § \16 ( 1834)
(emphasis added). Id. ("Suppose a person to be a slave in his own country, ha\·ing no personal
capacity to contract there, is he upon his remm·al to a foreign country, where slavery is not
tolerated, to be still deemed a slavd If so, when a Greek or Asiatic, held in slavery in Turkey,
would, upon his arrival in England, or in Massachusetts, be deemed a slave and be there
subject to be treated as mere property, and under the uncontrollable despotic power of his
master. The same rule would exist as to Africans and others, held in sla\'Cl)' in foreign
countries.").
142. Id. at 97, § 104 (emphasis added).
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recognized m any country, whose institutions and policy prohibit

s!avery. 143

Likewise, Chancellor Kent, the other great American conflicts
authority in the first half of the nineteenth century, agreed that
comity would not override strong local public policy regarding the
status of persons and their legal incidents. 144
Even Chief Justice Marshall, a Virginia slave-owner himself and
less ready to embrace legal principles hostile to slavery, agreed that
slavery was contrary to natural law (but not to the law of nations )_14 5
In The Antelope, 146 he conceded that slavery originated in force and
required positive law to sustain and uphold it, a position not far
removed from Mansfield's statements in Somerset)s Case.
Thus, inter-jurisdictional conflicts law and domestic slavery law
were closely intertwined throughout Anglo-American legal history. 147
The best example of that is the infamous Supreme Court decision in
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 14x in which two of the three controlling issues
143. !d.
144. )AMES KENT, 2 CoMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 62 (1826) ("Laws and usages
of one state cannot be permitted to prescrilx qualifications for citizens, to be claimed and
exercised in other states, in contravention to their local policy.'').

145. See,Jreuerallv Cleveland, supra note 80, at 408-09.
146. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 66, 120-23 (1825).
147. One interesting example is Strader!'. Gmham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851), in
which the controlling question was whether temporary residence of a Kentucky slave in tree
Ohio cmd Indiana territory meant that he was a tree man on his return to Kentucky. Coming
bdc>re the Supreme Court of the United States just six years bdc>re the Dred Scott case, the
Court evaded the question lw dismissing the case t()r want of jurisdiction, but in dicta that
tc>recast his opinion in Dred Scott, Chief ) ustice Taney argued that ted era! law concerning
emancipation by temporary residence in a place was not binding on the state courts. Cleveland,
supra note 80, at 410- I I.
148. Drcd Scott v. Sandtc>rd, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Many excellent legal and
historical scholars have grappled with Dred Scott and these issues. See generally AUSTIN ALLEN,
0Rrl;r:-.:s Or THE DRED Scurr CASE 62-64 (2006) (discussing the influence of Story's
Commentaries on the Contlict of Laws on the slavery issue); COVER, supra note 84, at 83-99
(discussing conflict of laws dimensions of slavery in the American courts before the Civil War);
DO:--J E. !'EHREN BACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 322-414 (1978) (analyzing the case); id. at
56-67 ( discmsing conflict of laws dimensions); I'INKELMAN, DRED Scorr, supra note 62;
1'1:-.:KELMAN, IMPERFECT, supra note 62 (tracing history of comity in slave transit in the
United States); 1 JoH:-.: CODMAN HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES (Negro Univ. Press 1968) ( 1858) (examining, inter alia, private international
law in colonial and antebellum America); ROBERT B. SHAW, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN
THE UNITED STATES 253-78 (1991) (discussing emancipation in the northern states, role of
going into tree jurisdictions); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF A.'\/TISLAVERY
Co:-.:STITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760--1848, at 31 (1977) (discussing comity and contlicts
aspects of slavery jurisprudence before the civil war); Cleveland, supra note 80; Sanford
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were conflict of laws issues, including a vexing choice of law issue. 1·w
In 1846, a black man named Dred Scott, living in St. Louis,
Missouri, brought suit in a Missouri state court claiming that he \vas
a free black, not a slave, because his master had taken him from
Missouri to Illinois and to the federal territories north of Missouri,
where they had lived for over tour years. 1" 0 Dred Scott had been the
slave of Dr. John Emerson, a surgeon in the U.S. Army, who took
him to live on military bases in free jurisdictions including the state
of Illinois (tor two-and -a- half years) and the tCderal territory of
Wisconsin in what is today Minnesota (fC.>r a total ofthree·and-a-half
years ). 151 Illinois had abolished slavery, and, under the Missouri
Compromise of 1820, Congress had barred slavery in all territories
north of Missouri including the Wisconsin Territory. Scott argued
that by residing for extended periods in those tree jurisdictions he
had been emancipated, and that "once free, he was always tree." 152
The main substantive issue was whether a slave became free,
emancipated, by residing in a free state or jurisdiction-an issue of
conflict of laws regarding domestic relations status, presumably
governed at least in part by federal law that made the territories fi·ee.
In I850, a "jury of twelve white men in Missouri" ruled that Scott
had been emancipated by his "residence in a tree state and a free
Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional LaJP, in SLAVERY AND THE LAW RY, Y2-Y7
(Paul finkelman eLl., 1997) (commenting on Dred Scott and ]'rill/! l'. l'enmylmnitl, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 536 (1842)); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Cm~qress, A1'ticle IV, and httentate
Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1268, 14RY-512 (2007) (reviewing vertical and horizontal
federalism in fugitive slave cases).
141). The other conflicts issue (besides whether residence in a li-ce state or territory
emancipated a slave as a matter of federal choice oflaw binding on the states) was a question of
jurisdiction of the federal court-whether Dred Scott was a citizen of Missouri and, thus,
whether diversity jurisdiction existed as betwec:n Scott and the ddi:ndant, a citizen of New
York. The importance of the interjursidictional issues in ])red Scott is suggested hy the EKt that
"when rereading the Dred Scott decision one is struck by the extent to which the Justiccs relied
upon international and tixeign legal authority to support their positions." Cleveland, .wpm
note 80, at 3YS-Y6 (noting some scholars correlate citation of l(n-cign <lurhority to
"problematic opinions" of the Court) (citations omitted).
150. fiNKELMAN, DRED SCOTT, wpm note 62, at 1-3. Scott had married his witi:,
Harriet, while in the Wisconsin Territory, and they had two daughters, Eliza and I .izzie. Eliza
"was born on a boat [that was North of Missouri J in the Mississippi River surrounded on one
side by the tree state of Illinois and on the other side by the tree territory of Wisconsin." !d. at
IY. Lizzie was born later, in Missouri. In his lawsuit Scott sought fi·eedom t(Jr his wit<: and
children as well. ld. See Henerally l'FHRENBACHEH., .wpm note 14R; l'INKELMA:-.1, supm note
62.
151. FINKELMAN, D REI l SCOTT, supra note 62, at I -3.
!52. FINKELMAN, DRFD SCOTT, supra note 62, at v.

I890

1855]

From Slavery to Same-Sex MarriaJfe

territory." 1" 3 Two years later, however, overruling tvventy-eight years
of precedent, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed that decision,
citing the growing interstate slavery tensions. 154 Chief Justice Scott
(ironically named) noted that "[t]imes are not now as they were
when the t(mner decisions on this subject were made. " 1ss He meant
that since the northern tree states had abandoned the sojourner rule
and their prior practice of not emancipating slaves who had come
only temporarily into the free state, Missouri, a southern slave state,
felt compelled to respond by abandoning its prior practice of
recognizing the emancipation of southern slaves who had resided or
worked in a free state. 15 ('
Scott next sued in federal court in Missouri, which upheld his
right to sue but rejected his claim to treedom. 157 Then Scott took his
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1857, eleven years after Scott
began his legal quest f()r freedom, the United States Supreme Court,
by a vote of seven to two, rejected Scott's claim. 158 "Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney declared that the Missouri Compromise was in fact
unconstitutional and that Congress had no power to prohibit slavery
in the national territories or to emancipate slaves brought into those
territories. Furthermore, Chief Justice Taney went out of his way to
assert that African Americans, even if free, could claim no legal
protection [as citizens] under the Constitution." 159
The Dred Scott decision was, as Professor Alexander Bickel
labeled it, a "ghastly error," 160 and, as Charles Evans Hughes
acknowledged, "the Court . . . suffered severely from self-inflicted

I S3. I d. at 20. "Missouri was one of the most liberal states in the nation on this" issue;
between 1824 and 1837, the Missouri Supreme Court had decided eleven cases in favor of the
cnuncipation of slaves who had worked or established residence in a free state. Id. "Courts in
Kentucky, I .ouisiana, and Mississippi also upheld the treed om of slaves who had lived in a ti-ce
state or terri ton·." Id.
154. Scott v. Emerson, IS Mo. 576 (1852).
155. Jd.at586.
156. CO\'El\, supra note 84, at 97 ("Both by legislation and by judicial decision, the
Southern approach . . I of recognizing emancipation of slaves by their residence in a tree state]
was gcncrallv reversed in the last ten or fifteen years before the Civil War.).
!57. The full report of the federal case is in Dred Scott P. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
39.3 (I ~57). !'or an excellent review of the choice of law analvsis of the various justices, sec
Cleveland, supra note 80, clt 428-.34.
158. Drcd Scott, 60 U.S. at 393.
1 SY. rll'KEI.MA;\;, DR Ell SCOTT, mpm note 62, at vi.
160. AL~.XA~DER M. BICKEL, THE Sl'PRH,IE COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 41
I Yale Liniv. l'ress 1978) ( 1970), citfd in FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT, Jupra note 62, c1t 5.
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wounds." 161 As Professor Lino Graglia has suggested, any judicial
decision that leads to a Civil War is not a good decision. 162 Dred
Scott overturned settled precedent including a very recent Supreme
Court decision that held that each state had the authority to
determine the status of persons within its territory, including free
states deciding whether non-fugitive slaves visiting or residing there
were emancipated, and slave states determining whether or not to
liberate slaves who had resided in a free territory. 163 By striking down
the Missouri Compromise, whose roots went back to the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, the Dred Scott ruling hurtled the nation towards
a bloody Civil War. 164 After that horribly devastating conflict ended,
the three major holdings of Dred Scott were overturned by the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fitt:eenth Amendments. 165

161. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50
(Columbia Univ. Press 1928 ), cited in FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT, supra note 62, at 5.
162. See Lino A. Graglia, City of Boerne v. Flores: An Essay on the Invalidation of the
Rel(qious Freedom Restoration Act, 68 MISS. L.J. 675, 682 (1998) (citing Lino A. Graglia,
"Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1019, 1020 ( 1992 )).
163. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82,96-97 (1850).
164. In 1787, prior to the ratification of the Constitution, Congress, acting under the
Articles of Confederation, passed the Northwest Ordinance, which "prohibited 'slavery and
involuntary servitude' in all of the American territories north and west of the Ohio River," and
the following year, Congress, under the new Constitution, ratified the Northwest Ordinance.
FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT, Iupra note 62, at 8. In 1820, when debate erupted over the slaveor-free status of slaves in states formed from the land acquired by the Louisiana Purchase of
1803 (that had not been part of the United States when the Northwest Ordinance was
adopted), the Missouri Compromise of 1820 revised the Ordinance to "f(xever prohibit[]"
slavery in all territory acquired by the Louisiana Purchase except in the state of Missouri. I d. at
8-9. When the northern states tried to extend that prohibition of the spread of slavery into
territory acquired in the Mexican War, by the Wilmot Proviso, the southern states defeated the
Proviso and deadlocked the issue for four years. The deadlock was resolved by the
Compromise of 1850, which, inter alia, brought Calif(xnia into the Union as a free state, but
allowed slavery in all of the other territory acquired in the Mexican-American War (which
included California, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, and most of Arizona and Colorado). Id. at 9.
The Compromise of 1850 also included a harsh new federal fugitive slave law and banned the
sale of slaves in the District of Columbia. I d.
165. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human}kind": The
Value of Comparative Perspective in Constitutional AdJudication, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 187, 189 (2007) ("[T]he Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution reversed the Dred Scott judgment .... "). See generally Henry L. Chambers,
Jr., Dred Scott: Tiered Citizenship and Tiered Personhood, 82 CHL-KENT L. REV. 209, 219
(2007) (stating that the Reconstruction Amendments were a reply to the Dred Scott decision);
Louis Fisher, Constitutional Law Writ Large, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 633, 642 (2005) ("[Dred
Scott] was eventually overturned by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and fifteenth
Amendments .... ").
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B. Other Controversial Domestic Relations Issues in American
Conflicts Law
The same general approach characterized the resolution of most
cont1ict-of-laws issues involving inter-jurisdictional recognition of
interracial marriage, polygamy, underage marriages, consanguinity,
and adoption. Comity was the underlying default position, but it
generally yielded when it was shown that recognizing the foreigncreated domestic relationship would cont1ict with strong local public
policy.

1. Interstate recognition ofinterracial marriage
After the adoption of the Civil War Amendments, the interstate
controversy regarding recognition of slavery or emancipation ended,
but in its place interstate cont1icts arose regarding recognition of
interracial marriages for another century. Like slavery, interracial
marriage was very provocative and aroused very intense passions that
sometimes were expressed in state anti-miscegenation laws. 166
Interracial marriages were prohibited in some states but permitted in
others, and the list of such states expanded and contracted over
time. 167
As a general rule, states that prohibited interracial marriages
declined to recognize interracial marriages that had been lawfully
created 111 other jurisdictions. "Although there were notable
exceptions ... most states with anti-miscegenation laws refused to
recognize out-of-state interracial marriages. " 168 Conversely, states

166. Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recolrnition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions:
A Handbook jlw Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2149 (2005) [hereinafter Handbook]
(suggesting that among the historic marriage recognition conflicts that arose in America,
"[ i ]nterracial marriage aroused the strongest passions in the courts").
167. See Peter Wallenstein, Law and the Boundaries of Place and Race in Interracial
Marrialfe: Interstate Comity, Racial Identity, and Misc(qenation Laws in North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Vizqinia, 1860s-1960s, 32 AKRON L. REv. 557, 561 (1999) (describing how
South Carolina went from a state that allowed interracial marriage to a state with an antimiscegenation law in 1879, which was vigorously enforced). See generally Lynn D. Wardle &
Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise of Loving: Reflections on the "Loving Analolfy" for Same-Sex
Marrialfe, 51 How. L.J. 117, 162-63 (2007) (summarizing anti-miscegenation law's waning
history); id. at App. III & Maps A-C (showing the eradication of anti -miscegenation laws).
168. John Bash, Recent Development, Abandoning Bedrock Principles?: The Musgrave
Amendment and Federalism, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 985, 1004 (2004) ("[T]he record
clearly shows that interstate recognition of interracial marriages was historically not mandated
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause."); see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 1 ( 1967); State v.
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that allowed interracial marriage declined to disallow or void such
marriages in their jurisdictions even if the parties resided in a state
that prohibited the marriage.
However, a more careful review shows that the history of
interstate enforcement of sister-state anti-miscegenation laws vvas
actually more complicated, as state courts responded to the
recognition-of-interracial-marriage issue "in a wide variety of ways,"
as Professor Randall Kennedy has noted. 161) For example, North
Carolina and California recognized interracial marriages that were
lawfully performed elsewhere even though they, at some time,
banned interracial marriage domestically. 170 On the other hand, "a
few [states] that did permit interracial marriage nonetheless voided
marriages contracted within their borders by persons seeking solely
to evade the marital regulations of their home jurisdictions." 171
The legal context also influenced the outcome. If the interjurisdictional recognition issue arose in the context of an evasive
marriage, the public policy implications and the judicial analysis
might be different than if the issue arose in the context of a bonafide change of domicile. 172 "The older miscegenation decisions
distinguished between parties who evaded the [anti-miscegenation]
laws of their domicile ... and parties who contracted the interracial
marriage while domiciled in a state that did not prohibit such
unions. " 173 Professor Andrew Koppelman summarized the evasion

Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1877); State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 (1872); Kinney v. Commom\·ealth,
71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858 (1878).
169. RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARIUAGE, IDE:-.;TITY .A.:--.:D
ADOPTION 232 (2003).
170. See, e.g., Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157 (1819) (recognizing that a prohibited
interracial marriage was solemnized fi>r evading Massachusetts couple in Rhode Island); State
v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242 ( 1877) (recognizing interracial marriage of parties residing in South
Carolina where legal); KENNEDY, supra note 169, at 232, n.t. But s-ee State \'. Kennedy, 76
N.C. 251 (1877) (invalidating, though decided in the same term and by the same court as
Ross, an evasive interracial marriage performed in South Carolina t(Jr North C.1rolina residents
who immediately returned to North Carolina), discuned i11 Wallenstein, supra note 167, at
558-60.
I 71. KEN:-.;Ei)Y, supra note 169, at 232 & n. t (citing Comment, lntcrmarria.Hc wit!J
Nq.Jrocs-A Surpey of State Statutes, 36 YALE L.T. 858 ( 1927) ).
172. See, c.,_q., Whittington v. McCaskill, 6I So. 236 (l'la. 1913); Miller\'. Lucks, 36 So.
2d I40 (Miss. 1948); Ross, 76 N.C. 242; sec also People v. Godines, 62 P.2d 787 (Cal. Ct.
App. I936); Eggers v. Olson, 231 P. 483 (Okla. 1924) (refusing to recognize, f(>r inheritance,
interracial marriage).
173. Henson, supra note 16, at 572; see als'o Koppelman, supra note 166, at 2153 ("The
law with respect to evasi\-e marriages is quite clear. ... Thf e] antievasion principle was applied,
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cases as f(Jllows: "Despite some early Northern authority to the
contrary, Southern courts always invalidated these marriages." 174 On
the other hand, when mixed-race parties domiciled in a state that
allowed interracial marriage got married there and later moved to a
state that did not allow interracial marriage, stronger policy
considerations favored recognition than in the case of evasive
marriages. 170 Nonetheless, in the Deep South, the courts split evenly
over whether to recognize such imported interracial marriages. 176
Also distinguishable are what Professor Koppelman calls
'"extraterritorial' cases, in which the parties have never lived within
the state but the marriage is relevant to litigation conducted
there. " 177 Some states that would not allow or recognize interracial
marriages for purposes of marital cohabitation would recognize
interracial marriages for purposes of inheritance.m For example, the
Mississippi Supreme Court overruled a lower court which had
refused to recognize an Illinois interracial marriage and held that the
white husband of a deceased black wife was entitled to inherit his
wife's property in Mississippi, even though the couple had been
indicted and ordered to leave the state of Mississippi when they had
lived together in Mississippi two decades earlier. 179 The court
reasoned:
The manifest and recognized purpose of this statute was to prevent
persons of Negro and white blood from living together in this state
in the relationship of husband and wife. Where, as here, this did
not occur, to permit one of the parties to such a marriage to inherit

howe\'cr, onlv in cases where the parties were domiciliaries of the forum at the time of the
marriage.").
174. Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex MarriaHe, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX.
L RE\'. 921, 951 ( 199l:l) [hereinafter Koppelman, Policy]; see also id. at 952-54 (discussing
cases in\'ol\'ing an attempt to prohibit interracial marriage).
175. Sccid.atYSI.
176. Sa Koppelman, supra note 166, at 2154 (comparing State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242
(IX77), with State 1'. &ll, 66 Tenn. Y ( 1X72)); Koppelman, Policy, supra note 174, at 955-61
(discussing the same and other cases and statutes).
177. Koppelman, supra note 166, at 2145, 2162-64.
17X. KENNEDY, sttpm note 16Y, at 234-35 (citing Miller\'. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140 (Miss.
IY4l:l)).
17Y. /d.
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property in this state from the other does no violence to the
purpose of [the Mississippi miscegenation laws ]. 180

Likewise, the content, ideology, and strength of public policies
changed over time. 181 As the local domestic policies against
interracial marriage weakened and changed, the willingness of courts
to recognize interracial marriages increased. 182 Similarly, an absence
of interracial marriage and cohabitation criminal penalties influenced
the choice of law analysis. 183

2. Inter-jurisdictional recognition of polygamy
Polygamy is one of two types of marriage which Anglo-American
courts historically have deemed to be intrinsically contrary to natural
law and not entitled to inter-jurisdictional recognition in states
which forbid polygamous marriages, even if contracted in a state in
which polygamy is legal. Justice Story listed polygamy and incest as
"the only known exceptions" to the general rule that a marriage
valid where performed was valid everywhere. 184 The reason he
provided was that "Christianity is understood to prohibit polygamy
and incest; and therefore no Christian country would recognize
polygamy, or incestuous marriages." 185 Modern conflicts of law
authorities agree: "In order for the marriage to offend the fT orum]
court's sensibilities so deeply, the marriage usually will have to be
polygamous, or between persons so closely related that the court

180. Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140, 142 (Miss. 1948); see Whittington v. McCaskill, 61
So. 236 (Fla. 1913) (holding that although prohibited in !:'lorida, interracial marriage
perf()rmed in another state on residents of that state will be recognized in florida f(Jr purpose
of inheritance); see also Henson, supra note 16, at 573 ("States seemed most concerned with
.");
public policy violations when the interracial couple lived within their borders
Wallenstein, supra note 167, at 570-71.
181. See Wardle & Oliphant, .rupra note 167.
182. This also may explain the decision of the Mississippi courts in the Miller case. The
policy f(,rbidding intimate relations between the races was strong in 1923, but it had waned
sufficiently by 1948 fix the court to allow an interracial surviving spouse to inherit.
183. Henson, supra note 16, at 573 (noting that states were most reluctant to recognize
foreign interracial marriages of parties who lived in the state "especially if crimi1ul statutes
existed in the state").
184. STORY, supra note 141, at 104.
185. !d.; sec also Schofield v. Schofield, 51 Pa. Super. 564 ( 1911) (holding nonrecognition valid because contrary to civilization); Hyde v. Hyde, 1 L.R.P. & D. 130 (U.K.
1866) (holding that marriage that was "potentially polygamous" would not be recognized by
allowing divorce petition).
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views their marriage with horror." 1x6 Koppelman correctly notes that
historically in the United States, "[ t ]he public policy exception [to
the comity rule of marriage recognition if valid where performed]
has been invoked primarily in three contexts: polygamy, incest, and
miscegenation." 187
However, as in the case of interracial marriages, the context
profoundly shaped the outcome of the cases. Few cases arose in
which the recognition of the validity vel non of a polygamous
marriage of in-state parties was for the purpose of legitimizing
polygamous cohabitation in that jurisdiction. For example, it has
long been common for American courts to recognize polygamous
marriages for purposes of non-cohabitation incidents such as
inheritance. 188 Some cases involved marriages among or with Indians
who lived on and off tribal territory-whose tribal law allowed
polygamous marriage-implicating the complex and confusing
subject of inter-sovereign relations with the Indian nations; most
often the marriages were recognized "as valid for purposes of
claiming certain incidents of marriage. " 189
The recognition of a polygamous wife's marriage for purpose of
allowing her to receive some legal benefit after the death of her
husband was another common scenario. Perhaps the most wellknown case of this type is In re Dalip Singh Bir)s Estate, 190 in which
both wives of an immigrant from India were permitted to inherit and
divide his estate equally. Reversing the lower court, which had

186. RUSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT Of LAWS§ 5.1, at 309
(5th ed. 2006); see also ROBERTA. LEI'LAR ETAL., AMERICAN CONfLICTS LAW§ 221, at 610
(4th ed., 1986) ("Polygamous marriage of local domiciliaries would likewise fall under the
condemnation of strong social policy in American states, even though they be performed at
some place at which they would be valid."); ANDREAS~. LOWENFELD, CONFLICT OF LAWS
7 49 (2d ed., 1998) (stating that the interjurisdictional marriage recognition "varied widely
once one got past prohibitions against bigamy and incest"); EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL.,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 13.9, at 573-77 (discussing "progressive polygamy" of forbidden
remarriage after divorce).
187. Koppelman, Policy, supra note 174, at 946.
188. See, e.._q., Hallowell v. Commons, 210 F. 793 (8th Cir. 1914) (holding that children
of polygamous union nevertheless have the right to inherit as lawful children).
1S9. Henson, supra note 16, at 564; see also LEFLAR ET AL., mpra note 186, at 613-14
(stating that the law of party's tribe governed their marriage status).
190. 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (allowing both wives of a Punjabi
immigrant to inherit); see also Royal v. Cudahy Packing Co., 190 N.W. 427 (Iowa 1922)
(allowing the second, polygamous wife of a Syrian immigrant to recover a worker's
compensation award after he was killed during his employment).
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denied recovery on the ground that the marriage violated strong
public policy in Calit(xnia, the appellate court held:
The decision of the trial court was influenced by the rule of "public
policy"; but that rule, it would seem, would apply only if decedent
had attempted to cohabit with his two vvives in Calit()rnia. Where
only the question of division of property is involved, "public
policy" is not affected .191

Likewise, many polygamy-recognition cases have involved
premature or improper remarriages of parties who were divorced in
jurisdictions that forbade or restricted the marriage of a divorced
person to anyone but his or her former spouse, at least f(x a period
of time. The public policy underlying those restrictions is (and was)
easily distinguished from the strong public policy against
polygamous marriage. 192 In such cases (and, indeed, in all
recognition-of-polygamous-marriage cases), "[ t ]he controlling issue
becomes whether the policy of prohibition, as expressed by the
legislative body, is strong enough in regard to the particular issue
before the court to prevail over the policies furthered by upholding
the marriage." 193

3. Interstate marriage recognition and

consa1~;_quinity

restrictions

The other form of marriage said to be universally repugnant and
non-recognizable in American conflicts cases and commentary were
consanguineous
marriages, 194
sometimes
mistakenly
called
"incestuous" marriages. 19 " But, unlike polygamy, there was some
uncertainty about where the line was drawn within which marriages
were deemed abhorrent to common decency (or, earlier, to
Christianity). As Story noted, "[ i ]t is ditlicult to ascertain exactly the
point, at which the law of nature, or Christianity, ceases to prohibit

191. In rc Dalip, 188 P.2d at 502.
192. Sec, eB., SCOI.E~ ETA!.., .rupra note 186, at S73-77; LEFI.AK E"l AI.., .rupm note 186,
at 611·-12.
l 93. SCOLES ET AI.., supra note 186, at 57S. "If the statutory language is unmistakable,
the court mav feel there is little it can do but tdlow it. Howe\Tr, in most instances, the result
in a particular case should, and will in large mcasme, depend upon which of the competing
policies has a greater weight with the comt." !d. at 575-76.
l 94. See suprtl notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
I 95. The error is because incest is not a marriage concept or condition, but a criminal
concept .md condition. The ci\·il marriage restriction was called conscmguinitv (.md, rarclv,
atlinitv ).
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marriages between kindred; and nations arc by no means in
agreement on this subjcct." 196 The modern marriage laws also reflect
a degree of disparity in where to draw the line; for example, thirty
American states prohibit marriage of fl.rst cousins, but twenty allow
such marriages. 197
Likewise, to put it in modern terms, the degree of intrusion
upon the public policy of the second state depends in no small part
on the degree of consanguinity of the parties. Thus, in cases of direct
lineage (marriage of ancestor and descendant), or brother-sister,
most courts have refused to recognize the marriage. 19H Uncle-niece
marriages have often arisen in the context of parties to a religion that
allows or makes special dispensation tor such marriages and while the
cases are split, especially in the religious marriage context, many
allow recognition. 199 The well-known In re l'rfa/s Estatc 00 upheld an
evasive Rhode Island marriage between an uncle and niece of halfblood from New York, despite a New York law prohibiting such; the
debate between the majority and dissent focused on whether the
internal domestic relations law expressed strong public policy, was
intended to bar interstate recognition, and whether the particular
marriage was in violation of the core interests of the law.
Ironically, while it is mostly the younger (western) states that
prohibit first-cousin marriages, it is the older cases from the older
states that tended to decline recognition to first-cousin marriage
when prohibited in the second jurisdiction, but the more recent
cases tend to accept them as not violative of strong public policy. 201
Henson notes that the e\·olution toward recognition of first-cousin
marriages generally correlates with the decriminalization of sex
between first cousins. 202 Overall, "[ i]nstanccs where a marriage good
where contracted has been declared void at the domicile because of
the l kinship l relationship of the parties arc in the minority. " 203 A
leading contemporary cont1icts treatise summarized the prevailing

STORY, .111pm note 141, .lt 104; sec also id. §§ 115-16, at lOS-OiL
Scc National ( :onkrcnce of State Legislatures, State L1ws Regarding Marriage
hrst ( :ousins, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/ cousins.htm.
I.F.Fl.:\R Fl :\!.., supm note 11\6, at 610.
1'JY. Henson, supra note 16, .lt 567-611.
200. 114 N.E.2d 4 (NY. IYS"J20 I. Henson, supm note 16, at 567--611.

I'J6.
I Y7.
Between
1<;IX.

202. Id.
203. S<:OLlcS FT AI.., supm note 1X6, at 57 X.
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and preferred analysis of the consanguineous marriage recogmtion
question as: "Does the local prohibition represent a policy so strong
that the court at the domicile will declare the attempted marriage
void, instead of applying the usual approach of validating the
marriage? " 204
4. Interstate recognition of teenagers) marriages
Cases involving recognition of marriages of teenagers who were
too young to marry in the forum, but were of age to marry in the
sister state in which they married, are split. 20 ' But the cases tend to
be very context-sensitive. The result reflects such things as how long
the parties lived together after the marriage/ 06 whether any children
were born, whether it is apparent that it was a bad marriage, whether
the under-aged party or parties confirmed the marriage upon
reaching majority, 207 how young the under-aged party was/ 08
whether the domestic statute made underage marriages void or
voidable, whether the suit was civil or criminal/ 09 who brought the
suit, how recent the vintage of the domestic law was, 210 and whether
the marriage was evasive.m As the Graves case illustrates, "results
may be varied on similar sets of facts by reason of the issue in the
particular lawsuit. " 212
When underage marriages have been upheld, even evasive
marriages, it usually has been because the court has looked at the
circumstances of the case and determined that they did not threaten

204. Id.
205. See, e.g., State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1957) (upholding marriage as not
violative of strong public policy); Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65 ("-!.). 1958)
(invalidating marriage where husband was confined in a reformatory, and under aged wite, had
not confirmed her marriage after majority); Capasso v. Colonna, 122 A. 378 (N.J. Ch. 1923)
(upholding marriage since teenaged wifC was only nine months under age, and \Yotdd have had
age capacity to marry in the f(Jrum even though she lacked it in the state of celebration); De
Fur v. De Fur, 4 S.W.2d 341 (Tenn. 1928) (statutorilv increasing age of marriage to reflect
strong public policy).
206. Wilkins, 140 A.2d at 65.
207. Id.
208. Capasso, 122 A. at 378.
209. Graves, 307 S.W.2d at 545.
210. De Fur, 4 S.W.2d at 34l.
211. This is a consideration, but it is seldom dispositive because most of the underage
marriage cases involve evasive marriages.
212. LEFLARETAL.,supranote 186,at613.

1900

1855]

Prom Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage

the core policy of the forum. For example, in State v. Graves/ 13
parents of two teenagers were charged with (and initially convicted
of) contributing to the delinquency of a minor for taking their
seventeen year-old son and thirteen year-old daughter from
Arkansas, where the marriage of a male under eighteen and a female
under sixteen years of age was declared by statute to be "absolutely
void," 214 to Mississippi so that they could contract an evasive
marriage. In Mississippi, the couple was old enough to marry with
parental consent, which the defendants gave. Noting that such
marriages had been upheld for over a century, and that the cases
under the new statute were split two-to-one in favor of continuing
the practice of recognizing such marriages, the court concluded and
held the marriage to be valid. 215 Despite the "shall be absolutely
void" statutory language, the Arkansas Supreme Court declared that
"there is no strong public policy in this State requiring the courts to
declare that marriages such as the one involved here are void ab
initio. " 216
The diversity in marital age restriction policies in the American
states is exceptional; there are numerous line-drawing differences. 217
The fact of such variations manifests not only a lack of consensus
about the age of marriage policies, but also suggests that the lack of
consensus as to such details is relatively unimportant. Modern
commentators tend to favor recognition of such marriages in part
"because differences in legislative policy reflected in the statutory age
variations ... are usually slight. " 218

5. Interstate recoifnition ofprohibited adoptions and other domestic
relations
Adoption was not known at common law (it was invented in
Massachusetts in 1851 ), and Parliament did not enact legislation
allowing adoption in England until seventy-five years later. Thus, the
historic English rule that a domestic relations "status of a kind not

213. 307 S.W.2d S4S (Ark. 1957) (upholding teens' evasive marriage with parental
consent).

214.
215.
216.
217.
21 X.

Id. at 547 (quoting Ark. Stat.§ SS-102).
!d. at 550.
/d.at549.

Lvnn D. Wardle, Rethinking Marital Age Restrictions,22 ).
ScoLES ~-T AI.., supra note I 1\6, at 579.

PAM.

L. I (1984).
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recognized by English law will not be recognized as such in
England," 219 was applied to deny recognition ofAmerican (and other
jurisdictions') adoptions in England and other British jurisdictions
before those jurisdictions had enacted adoption laws. Since then, the
same principle has led many Anglo-American jurisdictions to decline
to recognize various forms of adoption that were non-existent in the
forum, including adult adoptions generally, adoptions of mistresses,
etc. 220
The traditional English rule that came to America with the
common law was "that 'a status of a kind not recognized by English
law will not be recognized as such in England. " 221 Applying that
principle, many state courts declined to recognize sister-state "adult"
adoptions in various contexts because the adoption of adults was
seen to be a different kind of institution than the lawmakers (or
testators or settlors) had in mind when they provided for the
inclusion of adopted children in certain statutes (or wills, or trust
provisions). 222 Similarly, commercial adoptions (baby-selling), and
adoptions of lovers (overlapping with adult adoptions) have raised
issues about inter-jurisdictional recognition of adoptions. 223
Likewise, the distinction between status and legal incidents is
relevant to the inter-jurisdictional recognition issue. 224 In adoption
cases, as in domestic relations generally, it is possible to recognize a
status but deny some or all incidents thereof which deny strong
domestic policies of the forum.
[S]ome authority would allow a sister state to refuse to accord the
incidents of adoption to a relationship established by means of an
out-of-state decree violative oflocal public policy .... [T]hese cases
might allow a court in the restrictive state to issue orders
inconsistent with the incidents that out-of-state adoptions would
ordinarily entail. For example, custody is ordinarily rm incident of
the parent-child relationship created by adoption; l but] under

219. G.C:. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (4th cd., 1952) (citation
omitted).
220. Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analy.ri.r of Interstate Adoptimt RcCI!fTitition of" rc.rbtqav
Adoptiom, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 561 (2005).
221. CHESHIRE, mpra note 219, at 147, discussed iu Charles W. Taintor, II, AdoptioN in
the Conflict ofLtTJv.r, 15 U. !'ITT. L. REV. 222, 259 ( 1954 ).
222. Wardle, supra note 220, at 593-95, 600--09.
223. Id. at 595-96.
224. I d. at 597-99; LHI.AR ET AL., supra note 186, at 310.
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these cases perhaps a court in the restrictive state could cite this
state's strong anti-surrogacy policy to award custody to the
surrogate if she seeks to have the child returned even after the
issuance of a tina! out-of-state adoption decree in favor of the
semen-provider and his wite. 225

C. Prevailinlf Principles Used Historically for Resolving Conflicts Issues

Concerning Controversial Forms of Domestic Relations
As the historical cases involving inter-jurisdictional conflicts
concerning recognition of controversial forms of domestic relations
illustrate, choice of law principles are constructed "out of the
universals of jurisprudence underlying all law," as a matter of
"natural law," 226 as well as concern f()f sovereignty-local first, and
then foreign. All of these factors define and constrain the obligations
of comity. Thus, there arc three over-arching conflicts principles in
tension: ( l) inter-jurisdictional comity versus ( 2) principles of natural
law (or international law), and/ or ( 3) domestic sovereignty in
controlling internal public policy. 227 All were (and today still are)
valid principles of conflict of laws. While technical conflicts rules,
approaches, authorities, analyses, and considerations can be (and
often were) invoked to support giving priority to one or the other
principle in any given cont1ict of laws case involving controversial
domestic relations, ultimately which of the competing conflicts
principles was given precedence usually came down to a matter of
the substantive public policy of the domestic forum. Because there
was no agreement in the border and southern states that slavery
violated the natural law, nor consistency in support of that principle
in the northern states (except as a matter of slow progression over
time), resort to the natural law was not reliably or generally a
dispositive factor. Likewise, the other two natural law exceptions to
the presumption of inter-jurisdictional recognition, for polygamy and
incest, vvhilc not infrequently noted in cases in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, have not been generally invoked in recent
dccadcs. 22 H Additionally, in this post-modern era of non-essentialism

225. Susan Frdich Appleton, SurntqaLy Arran,_JfCntentJ and the Conflict of Laws, 1990
WIS. L. Rr.V. 399,419 (second and third emphases added).
226. CoVER, mjml note X4, at X5.
227. !d. at X5-X6.
22X. Perhaps that is due to increased communication, education, and travel raising
awareness that polygamy is still widely practiced in many nations and societies, and because of
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and deconstructionism, natural law arguments have less popular
appeal and persuasiveness than they had one hundred and tvvo
hundred years ago.
The historical record shows that in most cases, the recognition of
controversial foreign domestic relationships came down to a matter
of determining if local public policy strongly opposed it, and the
extent to which giving comity in the particular facts of context of the
specific case and the precise issue it raises would undermine that
policy. 229 Distilling the past cases, the critical question is: "How does
a court know when to comply with the ordinary practice of comity
and when to refrain? Principles and rules of choice of law begin to
answer such questions [but] ... not without ambiguity and difEculty
,230

While the specific resolution of these domestic relations conf1icts
has varied over time, from issue-to-issue, fi·om state-to-state, and
sometimes from case-to-case within states, several prevailing
principles emerge. First, protection of the strong domestic relations
policy of the forum sovereign IS the dominant, controlling
consideration. Second, respect for established relations and
presumptions in favor of upholding the validity or established
relationships were inf1uential considerations. Third, comity, as an
underlying principle respecting the equal sovereignty of other
jurisdictions, was a persistent (albeit rebuttable) presumption.
Fourth, fundamental human rights or "natural law" or "international
law" may occasionally inf1uence the analysis, and even may be
dispositive, but only in the rare cases is there a strong, unambiguous
consensus in support of the principle. Finally, when recognition of a
novel form of domestic relations would directly contradict or
seriously impair or defY a strong public policy of the forum sovereign
regarding domestic relations, that consideration consistently
controlled the outcome. Various other conf1icts principles could
clarifY or obfuscate the issues, but they give way to strong forum
public policy interests.

the lack of consensus even in our own country concerning exactlv where to "draw the line"
separating permissible from impermissible kinship f(x marriage, and because of the acceptance
of "sequential polygamy" of divorce-and-another-marriage attendant to adoption of unilatnalno-fault divorce-on-demand in all U.S. states.
229. "Of course, half of the game was determining which rival systems were entitled to
respect and acceptance under the comity theory." Bush, supra note 41, at 628.
230. COVER, supra note 84, at 84-85.
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Thus, the American cases involving inter-jurisdictional
recogmt1on of slavery, interracial marriage, polygamous marriage,
consanguineous marriage, underage marriage, and adoptions show
the most important factor predicting and controlling recognition of
controversial domestic relationships is the strength of the public
policy in the forum against the relationship in question. As the
slavery cases show, as domestic public policy changed to more
strongly oppose such relations, the courts became less willing to
recognize them even if they were validly created in a state where they
occurred. On the other hand, as the interracial marriage cases and
adult adoption cases show, as the domestic public policy changed in
favor of allowing such relationships, courts have shown greater
willingness to recognize them from foreign jurisdictions. As many
demonstrate,
especially
those
involving
polygamy,
cases
consanguinity, and underage marriage, the factual circumstances,
whether the issue involves status or incidents, and whether it would
infringe a core or a peripheral concern of the public policy, will
inf1uence whether recognition is given.
One additional factor, judicial preference or jurisprudence,
dearly has inf1uenced choice of law in inter-jurisdictional recognition
cases involving controversial domestic relations. While in some cases
strong positive law has left very little room for judicial discretion, it
has not in all cases precluded ameliorative analysis based upon a
judge's sense of justice. As Professor Robert Cover put it in his
classic examination of how judges expanded, followed, or
circumvented slavery statutes and precedents: "The courts might still
indulge in interstitial preference for liberty but not in the face of
dear manifestations of a contrary legislative policy. " 231 Courts today
are more aggressive about incorporating judicial notions of justice
into their judgments than they were in the nineteenth century. And
the ability, and demonstrated willing propensity, of judges to
manipulate choice of laws analysis to avoid application of a rule
which the judges dislike or to apply a rule which they prefer is wellknown.232 "[N]o matter what method [of choice of law analysis] a

231. !d.
232. See, eg., Brainerd Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict ofLaJVs, 13 STAN. L. REv.
719, 730 (1961) (criticizing Traynor); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of LaJVs,
and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1967-68 (1997)
(criticizing judicial manipulation of public policy exception); Joseph William Singer, A
Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731, 747 (1990) (noting how judges'
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court professes to use, its actual decisions arc more likely to reflect
'judicial intuition' or result-oriented substantive preferences than
anything else. " 233 for example, distinguished conflicts scholar Patrick
Borchers has noted, "substantive preferences are the most important
determinant in tort conflicts cases. " 234

III. CONTEMPORARY INTER- JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES REGARD!Nc;
GAY fAMILY RELATIONS

We are beginning to sec the emergence of a "bull market" m
litigation over conflict of laws issues resulting from the creation m
one state of f(xms of domestic relations (especially f(x "gay
families") that arc not allowed in other states into which the parties
to such relations seck to import their new legal status and benefits.
Since 2000, many American state and federal appellate courts have
addressed conflicts issues concerning inter-jurisdictional recognition
of same-sex domestic relations in reported cases. 235 The number,

pn.:fcrences influences choice of law); Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of'LaJJ'J' and Acwmcy iu the
Allocatirm of GoPcrrmmtt Re.,ponsibility, 26 VAND. J. T!Zi\NSC.:t\T'I. L. 975, 994-1002 ( 1994 I
(criticizing lack of predictability due to broad judicial discretion in determining conflicts c.1ses );
Michael Ena, Comment, C!Joiu of Law and Predictability of Dccisiom in Products Ut~bilit1'
Cases, 34 FORDHAM UKB. L.J. 1417, 1441-42 (2007) (stating that judicial manipulation
impairs predictability); see alm Amnon Reichm.m, The DirnemiorJI of J,aw: Judicial Cmji, lt.f
Public Perception, and the Role of the Scholar, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1619, 1671-72 (2007)
(prdcrence in judicial decision-making); Michael P. Ambrosio, Lc,qal Realism, 205 N.J. LAW.
MAG. 30 (Oct. 2000) (describing judicial decision-making generally: "In the exercise of their
discretion, judges will consciously or unconscious!\' rely on their sense of morality and ideas
about justice. Thus, it is inevitable that the choice of law and the interpretation of bets will
rdlect the \'alue preferences of judges and juries to limn the unarticulatcd basis !(Jr legal
decisions.").
233. Harold P. Southerland, SoPcreiwztv, Value Jur(qmen/.1', and Choia of Law, 3/:l
BRANDEIS L.J. 451, 501-02 (2000).
234. Patrick J. Borchers, C!Joicc ofLaJl' in the Amaicazt Court.> i11 !992: ()/zscrz•atirms tmd
Rcjlatiom, 42 AM. J. COM!'. L. 125, 143 (1994).
235. For !(JUr valuable sources of int(Jrmation on conflicts c.1ses involving same-sex l:1mih'
relations, sec Lesbian/Gay Law Notes (Arthur Leonard ed. ), http:/ jwww.nyls.edu/pages/
3876.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2009) (comprehensive review of legal developments in the ll.S.
and globally regarding gay rights); Symeon C. Symeonides, Ammal Sttrl'cys of' Choice of' Law i11
the American Courts, http:/ jwww.willamette.edu/wucl/journ.lls/wlo/c<mtlicts/indes.htm
(last visited Jan. 8, 2009) (published yearly since 1987 in the Americm Journal ofComparatil'e
Law); Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, Review of the Year in l'amily Law,
http://www.abanet.org/Eunily/llq/archives.html (last l'isited Jan. 8, 2009) (published in the
A.B.A's l'amily Law Section journal, Familv Law Quarterly tin· many years); Annual Review of
Gender and the Law, http://www.bw.georgetown.edujjounuls/genderjar/indcx.html (lJst
visited Jan. 8, 2009) (table of contents of the !Jtest review, published ye.1rly since 2000 in the
Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law).
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tl-cq uency, rate, and scope of such decisions seems to be increasing
every year:·':l6

A. Judicial Decisions Concerning Interstate Issues Regarding SameSex Marriagn~ Civil Unions, Domestic Partnerships, Adoptions and
Their Incidents
The first reported state appellate court ruling or federal court
decision on a conf1ict-of-laws issue resulting from the creation of
same-sex domestic relationships created in one state and imported
into another state came in 2000. Since that year, as Appendix A
shows, there have been nearly two dozen reported state appellate or
federal court rulings (and another ten significant other reported
opinions) addressing inter-jurisdictional conf1icts issues involving
attempted importation or exportation of some form of same-sex
domestic relationship allowed irt one jurisdiction but not (or not
clearly) allowed in another. Viewed broadly, ten of the opinions
declined recognition of the same-sex domestic relationship, nine
granted recognition of the relationships, and two were split. 237
However, looking at cases involving recogmtlon of same-sex
marriage or other relationships not permitted in the second state, the
picture is not so ambiguous. As Professor Symeonides has noted:
"Thus far, the majority of cases have denied such recognition.
Indeed, as of the time of this writing, only two lawsuits by same sex
partners have tound a hospitable forum in another state. However,
both suits sought the dissolution of the respective civil unions, and
one of them was filed in Massachusetts .... " 238

236. :-\either l nor my resc~rch assistants f(Hmd any reported appellate court decisions in
America before the year 2000 addressing such issues.
237. In Cote- W/Jitcacre, the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the Massachusetts
1-cverse m~rriagc evasion statute as applied to same-sex couples fi·om another state in which
such marri.1gcs arc prohibited, but then it went on to adopt a bizarre test for how to determine
if same-sex marri~gc was prohibited in such states that was blatantly biased in bvor of allowing
such couples to marrv in Massachusetts. Within months, in two subsequent cases, the highest
courrs of neighboring states of Rhode Island and New York, which the Massachusetts court
said were presumed to not prohibit same-sex marriage, disproved the Massachusetts
predictions and cxplicitlv declared that same-sex marriages were prohibited in those states.
Likewise, in Homtji:ld, the court rejected the claim that either a Canadian same-sex marriage
or Vermont civil union were sufficient to quality a same-sex couple for a residential property
disc1bilirv tax exemption, but the court hdd that under a recently enacted state Domestic
1\mncrship Act the couple would qualify for the exemption.
231\. SYMEON SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE INTER..'-:ATIONAL LAW 523 (2001\),
l!l'llilab!r at http:/ jwww.iclaws.com/l'RIL-USA.pdf (emphasis added); sec al.ro Koppelman,
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The outcomes of conflicts analysis in litigation over issues
concerning same-sex family relations has been summarized recently
as follows:
A state is free to apply its own laws to cases in which it has a
legitimate interest, provided that the parties against whom the laws
are applied are not unfairly surprised. Although a state must
recognize a final judgment of another state's courts, it need not
recognize a civil union certificate or birth certificate issued in
another state because no judicial process is involved. 239

This is generally accurate, but upon close examination of the cases
the picture is somewhat more complex.
The case opinions show that comity has been only seldom
mentioned as the dominant consideration in the choice of law
analysis of interstate recognition of same-sex marriage and similar
domestic relations. Virtually all of the analysis focuses on the
meaning, scope, and breadth of the local internal policy of the forum
state regarding same-sex family relationships and on whether (or the
extent to which) recognition or importation of the foreign status,
relationship, or benefits will contradict or undermine the local
domestic relations policy. When the court finds that there is strong
policy in the forum against legitimizing same-sex domestic relations
broadly, or against allowing the specific domestic relationship
involved in the case, they are likely to conclude against recognition.
Only rarely (and probably mostly in unreported or opinions of trial
court [presumably forum-shopped by the plaintiffs]) will a court
disregard or try to distinguish a clear domestic relations policy and
recognize such relations when domiciles acting in the state could not
create the same relationship.
On the other hand, when the court finds that there is a policy
generally in favor of same-sex relationships, or no strong policy
against allowing the particular same-sex relationship involved in the
case, they are generally inclined to uphold and recognize the
imported same-sex domestic relationship. Essentially, the courts see

Handbook, supra note 166, at 2164 ("Thus far, there is little case law on recognition offoreign
civil unions, and all of the cases involve evasive marriages.").
239. Diana Sclar, New Jersey Same-Sex Relationships and the Conflict of Laws, 59
RUTGERS L. REV. 351, 374 (2007); see also Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex Legal
Relationships in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 257 (2006) (overview of conflicts law in
the area of same-sex relations).
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no real inter-jurisdictional "conflict" in the case. Then they may
speak of comity interests or factors such as validation of existing
relations and upholding expectations. They perceive no challenge to
the forum sovereignty in recognizing the foreign relationship, nor
any loss to any strong forum family law policy.
The most diHicult cases are those in which the forum has a
strong public policy that seems to be narrowly focused, or the
strength of the public policy against such relationships seems
equivocal. for example, it may speak of barring (or barring
recognition ot) same-sex marriage, but not of same-sex civil unions
or same-sex partner adoptions. When the domestic relationship at
issue in the case is not within the narrow scope of the statute or case
rule defining the strong public policy, the court must determine
whether a penumbra emanates from the rule that covers the
contested relationship. Often the court appears to balance the
attenuated strength of any penumbral internal policy against the
relationship with competing interests. It is in this kind of "marginal"
case that traditional conflicts analysis is most useful and valuable.
B. Positive Law Developments Concerning Inter-jurisdictional Gay
Family Issues

There are two, not one, principles underlying the exceptions to
the general rule of comity. The first is what Professor Cover labeled
"the universals of jurisprudence underlying all law," or "natural
law. " 240 The second is the need to uphold the sovereignty of the
second forum embodied in its exceptionally strong public polic)'
relating to a subject of extraordinary importance to the integrity of
that statc. 241
It is debatable whether same-sex marriage comes under the first
exception. Historically, same-sex marriage would have been deemed
contrary to universal justice or natural law. Indeed, mere homosexual
relations were generally condemned and often proscribed since
Roman times (as well as in some periods of Roman and earlier

240. COVER, supra note 84, at 85.
241. See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 186, at 143-145; WEINTRAUB, supra note
186, at 106-112; Hogue, supra note 14; Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex "Marriage" and the
Public Policy Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 45 (1998) [hereinafter Myers, Same-Sex
"Marriage"]; RichardS. Myers, The Public Policy Doctrine and Interjurisdictinal Recognition of
Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, 3 AvE MARlA L. REV. 531 (2005) [hereinafter Myers,
Public Policy Doctrine J.
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civilizations ), 242 and long were deemed to violate the natural law. 2+-'
The ubiquity of conjugal, male-female marriage and the complete
absence of same-sex marriage in history underscores the point that as
a matter of universal understanding marriage involved conjugal
unions exclusively. That is a view that is still widely held, especially
among adherents to religions with a natural law tradition/ 44 such as
Catholicism. 245
Social mores have changed in the past forty years, however, and
it is the current consensus in the most atlluent and influential nations
that homosexual relations should be fully tolerated and morallysocially accepted. 246 Most of these progressive nations carefully
242. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986) ("It is obvious to us that
neither of these formulations would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in
acts of consensual sodomy. Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots. Sec
generally, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual
Activity, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 521, 525 (1986). Sodomy was a criminal ofknsc at common
law and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen States when they ratified the Bill of
Rights. 1n 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in
the Union had criminal sodomy laws."). Bowers was overturned on other grounds by I"awrma
1'. Te.xas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (noting that recent developments in Europe cmd America
undermine the significance of the historical prohibition of sodomy.).
243. See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEI'ENSE Or NATURAL LAW 139, 151, 202
(Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (arguing that homosexual relations violate natural Lnv); Raymond
B. Marcin, Nt!tttral Law, Homosexual Conduct, and the l'ublic l'olicy Exceptimt, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 67 (1998) (reviewing natural law analysis of homosexuality ti·om writings
of
Aquinas);
Homosexuality,
STA:-.!FORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/homosexuality (Nov. 29, 2006); Hany V. lath, Clarit)·ing
Homosexuality and Natural Law, http:/ jwww.darcmont.org/publications/pubid.484/
pub_detail.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2009); Harry V. Jafh, Homosexuality and Natural Lnv,
http:/ jwww .famguardian. org/Su bjects/Scxual Immorality /H omoscx uality /HomoAnd Natura
lLaw.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2009).
244. See John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 9 NOTRE DAI\IE ).L.
ETHICS & PuB. PoL'Y 11 (1995) (distinguishing public from private recognition of
homosexualiry on natural law grounds); Robert P. George, l'ublic Rcamn mtd Political
Conflict: Abortion and Homo.<exuality, 106 YALE L.J. 2475 ( 1997) (noting that in natural law
jurisprudence conjugal procreation is at core of marriage). See generally Marcin, supra note
243, at 67; Eduardo M. Pcnalver, Restorin.[f the Right Constitution?, 116 YALE L.). 732, 735
(2007) (reviewing R.A:-.!DY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LosT Co:O.:STITl 1TION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004)) (briefly reviewing rejection of homosexuality in modern
natural law jurisprudence).
245. Sec Congregation for Catholic Education, Instruction Coucenti1llf the Critcria.fitr tht

Discernment of Vocatiom with ReJJard to PemJm with Homoitxual Tmdencics iu View of 'Ihtir
Admission to the Seminary and to Holy Orders, http:/ jwww.\'atican.va/roman_curia/
congregations/ ccathcduc/ documents/rc_con_ccatheduc_doc_200511 04_istruzionc_en.html
(Jan. 8, 2009).
246. Lawrence\'. Texas, 539 U.S. at 576-77 (noting that developments in Europe and
most American states require constitutional legitimization of sodomy).
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preserve the distinction between marriage (for conjugal couples only)
and same-sex relations (entitled to different but equivalent legal
status and benefits), and only six out of 191 sovereign nations have
legalized same-sex marriage. 247 Still, in the most progressive nations
(including the United States), the trend toward acceptance of samesex unions is strong enough that it may have eroded the notion that
they are "universally" or "naturally" condemned.
Whether the second exception applies is a factual question
depending on the policy choices made by the policy-makers
(sometimes the sovereign people themselves) of a particular
jurisdiction. As most American states have adopted by popular vote
amendments to the state constitutions expressly banning same-sex
marriage, or more, and the vote in favor of such amendments has
averaged nearly seventy percent,248 it is clear that the public policy in
those states against recognition of same-sex marriage is strong
enough to support overriding the general comity rule of marriage
recognition. The nature and strength of the public policy concerning
same-sex marriage in the remaining states that do not have marriage
amendments is less clear, and (barring the convenient invention of
some overriding federal constitutional principle mandating
protection of conjugal or same-sex marriage) would require more
specific, state-by-state examination. However, the reason for nonsupport of such amendments often is that the public policy in the
state against same-sex marriage is so clear from existing statutes and
judicial precedents that a constitutional amendment is not
necessary. 249 It is likely that a finding of strong public policy against
recognition would be made in many of those states. But it is also
likely that reasonable judges in some states would conclude that
recognition of same-sex marriages is not barred by a strong local
public policy. 250

247. Sec in.fi·a App. D.
24R. CNN 2004 Election Results, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/
rcsults/ballot.mcasurcs/ (voting results on state constitutional amendments banning same-sex
marriage t(Jr II states).
249. Scr, c.,tr., Amanda ). Crawt(Jrd, Gopernor: Gay MarritllfC Referendum Unnecessary,
ARIZ. REI'l'BI.I<:, )ulv 3, 2008, http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/localjarticles/
2008/07 /03/20080703B 1-talker0703.html (noting that the Arizona governor opposed state
marriage amendment because state law against same-sex marriage is clear).
250. Some judge; have so ruled already, though not all of their analysis is impressive. See,
CJf., Lang<m v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of N.Y., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 415-16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003 ),
n-p'd, S02 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), appeal dismissed, R50 N.E.2d 672 (N.Y.
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Because of the complexity and political passion involved in such
inter-jurisdictional issues regarding same-sex domestic relations, and
because of the importance of forum domestic public policy in
resolving the issues, it should come as no surprise that, in addition to
judicial clarifications of the common law governing such issues,
lawmakers (and citizen -initiative supporters) in most states have
enacted positive laws (both statutory and constitutional) delineating
and emphasizing the strength of local legal policies regarding samesex domestic relations. Most positive law has been framed in terms of
domestic policy, but some explicit conflicts policies have also been
enacted.
By judicial opinion or legislation, a few states have created some
form or forms of gay family relations. As Appendix B shows, two
states, Massachusetts and California, have legalized same-sex
marriage, and both did so by anti-majoritarian judicial decree. 2 s1 Six
other states (two acting under judicial compulsion) have by statute
created new legal domestic status relationships for same-sex couples
that are equivalent to marriage but called something else (usually
called "civil unions"). 252 Three additional states and the District of
Columbia have extended by legislation only a few specific rights and
benefits of marriage to same-sex couples (often called "domestic
partner" or "reciprocal beneficiary" benefits), but do not provide

2006 ). The opinions of both the trial court tl>r recognition of a civil union and of the appellate
division reversing are credible.
251. In reMarriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Goodridge v. Dcp't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). However, the f<m11cr is the subject of a proposed
constitutional amendment which, if approved by the votes, will overturn the Calitim1ia
decision.
252. The states are California (arguably still allowed after In re MarriaHe Cases),
Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, and Vermont. (In Vermont and New
jersey, the legislation was mandated by a judicial decree.) The Oregon legislation has been
enjoined temporarily. It was to take effect in January 2008, but a group of citizens collected
signatures to invoke a procedure under the Oregon Constitution that prevents any law passed
by the legislature from taking effect until after the people have voted on whether to approve
the law, if enough citizens sign petitions invoking that procedure as to a particular law. The
petitions on their f3.ce contained more than the 55,179 required signatures, but upon review
by state election oftlcials, some of the signatures were disqualified and the petitions tell 96
signatures short of the number needed to stop the law from taking cfTect and to put it on the
November 2008 ballot. However, some disappointed petition signers tiled suit in federal
district court asserting that some sigmtures were wrongfully disqualified, and the court granted
a preliminary injunction so that a hearing could be held in february to consider the evidence.
Suzanne Pardington, ]ztdHe Halts Civil-Unions Law, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 29, 2007, at

AOl.
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marriage-equivalent legal status or benefits. 253 Same-sex couples and
partners are allowed to adopt children by statute or appellate
decisions in fourteen states. 254
On the other hand, as Appendix C shows, thirty-six states have
rejected creating any marriage-like legal status or marital benefits for
same-sex couples. 255 Forty-eight American states arguably now
recognize marriages as only the union between a man and a
woman/ 56 forty-five states by specific statutory or constitutional
prov1s10ns recognize marriage as only the union of a husband and
wife/ 57 and three more states have reached the same conclusion by
judicial interpretation of existing statutes. 258 Twenty-six states have
passed constitutional amendments defining marriage as the union of
husband and wife/ 59 including eighteen state constitutional
amendments that also prohibit creation of marriage-equivalent samesex civil unions (however labeled). Forty-one states have passed their
own "defense of marriage" positive laws (by statute, constitutional
amendment, or both) explicitly prohibiting courts from recognizing
same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions/60 and the

253. These states are Hawai'i, Maine, and Washington.
254. These states arc California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Vermont. See generally Wardle, supra note 8, at 513-14.
255. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, A Response to the "Conservative Case" for Same-Sex
Marriage: Same-Sex Marriage and "the Tragedy of the Commons," 22 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 441
(2008).
256. The only states that do not bar same-sex marriage by positive law or judicial decision
are Massachusetts and New Mexico.
257. See infra notes 255-56. Additionally, Maryland, Vermont, Wyoming, and
Connecticut have adopted statutory language recognizing marriage as the union of husband
and wife. MD. CODE AN~., I'AM. LAW§ 2-201; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8; WYO. STAT. A~N.
§ 20-l-101.
258. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338
(2006 ); Chambers v. Ormiston, 93S A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007).
259. ALA. CONST. amend. 774; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ARK. CONST. amend. 83;
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, para. l; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28;
KAN. CONST. art. IS,§ 16; KY. CONST. § 233A; LA. Co~ST. art. XII,§ 15; MICH. CONST.
art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. § 263A; Mo. Co~ST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art. 13, § 7;
NEB. CONST. art. I,§ 29; NEV. CONST. art. I,§ 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI,§ 28; OHIO CONST.
art. XV,§ 11; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 35; OR. CONST. art. XV,§ Sa; S.C. CONST. art. XVII,§
15; S.D. CONST. art. XXI,§ 9; TENN. CONST. art. XI,§ 18; TEX. CONST. art. I,§ 32; UTAH
CONST. art. I,§ 29; VA. CONST. art. I,§ 15-A; WIS. CONST. art. XIII,§ 13.
260. This includes the twenty-six marriage amendment states, supra note 2S9, plus the
following 15 states which have adopted statutory marriage recognition acts but no
constitutional provision. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 25-101 (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE§ 308.S
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expression of public policy in the statutes or judicial opinions barring
same-sex marriage might have the same effect in most remaining
states. 261 Adoptions by same-sex couples or partners arc explicitly
prohibited in seven statcs. 262
The main effect of these positive laws rejecting particular samesex domestic relations under traditional conflicts analysis 1s
summarized by Professor Peter Hay:
As a strong statement of public policy-stronger than the narrower
public policy exception of traditional law-these provisions [state
DOMAs] will ordinarily preclude adoption of alternative legal
same-sex relationships (such as 'civil unions,' ... ). They will also
likewise lead to a denial of recognition of same-sex legal
relationships (particularly, of course, same-sex marriage), validly
concluded under applicable law elsewhere, and of the incidents
t1owing from that status under the other state's or country's law. 2 ~>'

I concur in that analysis. Under settled cont1icts principles, such
respect for the domestic relations policy choice made by the
sovereign (people) of a particular state is clearly dispositive in the
absence of overriding legitimate federal Constitutional mandates,
which are entirely absent in this context. That result is also
compelled by the structural importance of federalism in family law in
our current American legal system.
further, however, is the value of these enactments to move the
discussion beyond traditional conflicts analysis, with its heavy
emphasis on comity and vested rights, and toward a more realistic
understanding that these kinds of questions both arc and should be
(in a democracy) decided primarily as matters of the domestic
relations policy of the forum sovereign. The eruption of positive law
regarding interstate recognition of same-sex family relationships
provides a golden opportunity for the maturation of American
(West 2()()4); DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (199<J); i'L".. STAT. AN~. § 741.212 (West
2005); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 572-3 (19<J9); 750 ILL. COM!'. STAT. A~K 5/212 (WN 199lJ);
IND. CODE § 31 ll 1-l (2003); IOWA CODE A~N. § 5<J5.2 (200 I); MI-.. REV. ST.H. A~K tit.
I<J-A, § 701 (l<J9X); MINN. STAT. AN:--1. § 517.01 (West 2006); N.J-1. REV. Si.\1. A~N. §
457: I to 3 (2004); N.C. GE:-.1. STAT. § 51 1.2 (2007); 23 l'A. Co~.'- STAT. AN~. § 1704
(West 20(ll); WASil. REV. CODE ANN.§ 26.04.020 (West 2005); W.V"".. CollE§ 4X-2 603
(2004).
261.

See lfCilcmllv supra notes

24R~50

and accompanying text.

262. ScelJcmmllyWardk, s1tj1ra note X, at

513~14.

263. Peter Hay, Ri'C<(qnition o(Samc-Scx Lc._qal Relationships in the United Statn; S4 ,\:\1.
). CoM!'. L. 257,263 (2006).
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conflicts of laws and its progression toward greater inclusion of the
politically accountable, policy-making legislative branches of our
state and national governments in the formulation of contemporary
choice of law rules and principles. The current controversies also
provide an excellent opportunity for the needed development and
clarification of American choice oflaw in family law.

( ;_ LeJ:mm From Recent Developments Regarding Recoifnition of Gay
Family Relations
These recent developments addressing interstate recognition of
gay family relations show the influence of several conflict-of-laws
principles that have been used to protect state sovereignty and strong
state domestic policies that arc relevant to and tied to the history of
conf1ict of laws regarding inter-jurisdictional recogmt1on of
controversial domestic relations. First, most states want to decide for
themselves, as a matter of local, internal policy, whether or to what
extent same-sex domestic relations will be allowed and recognized in
the state. They have taken steps to see that this matter is not dictated
and decided by other sovereigns. While this position has been most
noticeable in the case of opponents of same-sex marriage, who have
passed DOMA statutes and similar constitutional provisions to
protect that state's right (as in most states), it is equally evident in
the case of supporters of same-sex marriage who have opposed
passage of a federal marriage amendment on grounds that the
national sovereign should not decide these kinds of issues f(x
Massachusetts, Vermont, California, New Jersey, and other states
where law-makers are sympathetic to same-sex domestic relations.
Second, traditional comity principles of deference to status,
rights, or benefits deemed to have been "vested" by another
sovereign have had little influence in the cases so far. Rather, the
priority given to protecting local domestic relations policies has been
clearly and consistently 'the dominant and determinative
consideration. However, scholarship advocating greater influence of
comity in these cases is growing. 2M
264. Sec, c.._q., joanna L. Grossman, Rcsu1·rcctinB Comity: RcvisitinB the l'rohlems of NonUmfimn Marriacqc Laws, R4 OR. L. REV. 433 (2005); Malinda L. Seymore, lnter11ational
Adoption a11d lntcnmtional Comity: Wbm Is Adoption "RepuBrtllnt''?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 3RI (2004); Gennaro Savastano, Comment, Comity of Errors: Forci._qn Same-Sex
AfarriaJTCS iu Ne1p York, 24 T<lllKO L. REV. 199 (200R); sec also Gary Simpson, Beyond
l11tcrstatc Rcotqnition iu the Same-Sex Marriacqe De hate, 40 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 313 (2006 ).
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Third, the debate has centered on whether and to what extent
recognition of an imported status, right, incident, or benefit
undermines existing internal domestic relations policies of the forum.
The litigation often has boiled down to a debate over actual and
expected harms to state policies rather than balancing those state
interests with the conflicting interests of other jurisdictions. Some
respected scholarship has criticized the use of the public policy
exception in same-sex marriage recognition cases. 265 Many other
respected conflicts scholars have defended the public policy
exception. 266
Fourth, separation of legal form from substance, or incident from
label, may be useful for choice of law analysis. for instance, Professor
Koppelman has suggested distinguishing among incidents:
A sensible approach would be to distinguish between those
incidents that can be conferred by contract, such as those
pertaining to inheritance or to making medical decisions for one's
partner, from those that can only be conferred by operation of law,
such as the right to file a joint tax return or the right to a
homestead exemption. 267

That is a useful suggestion. However, analytically, an even more
reasonable approach would be to measure the incident against the
public policy embodied in the positive law (and clear appellate
precedents) to determine whether recognition of the controversial

265. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 232; Emily). Sack, CiPil Uniom and the Meanin;_IJ ofthe
Public Policy Exception at the Boundaries of Domestic Relations LaJF, 3 AvE MARIA L. REV. 497
(2005).
266. See, e.g., Hogue, supra note 14; Myers, Public Policy Doctrine, supra note 241;
Myers, Same-Sex "Marriage," supra note 241. Support for this seems to underlie the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws position. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 283(2) (1971), states the general rule as f(>llows: "A marriage which satisfies the
requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere he recognized as valid
unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage." While the Restatement's
proposed "most significant relationship" standard is not accepted by all states, the statement of the
general rule of marriage validation and the general public policy exception noted by the
Restatement are accepted. As one brief has stated: "Many recent cases reaffirm this principle. As the
Virginia Court of Appeals recently noted, 'no state is bound by comity to give effect in its courts to
the marriage laws of another state, repugnant to its own laws and policy."' Brief of Amici Curiae of
the States of Utah, Nebraska and South Dakota at 11-12, Goodridge v. Dcp 't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08860) (quoting Hager v. Hager, 349 S.E.2d 908, 909 (Va.
Ct. App. 1986 ), citing Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 4 S.E.2d 364, 366 (Va. 1939) ).
267. Koppelman, Handbook, supra note 166, at 2158.
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relationship for purposes of the particular incident, whether privatecontractual or public-legislative, conforms with or violates the public
policy.
Finally, proper responsibility for deciding whether to allow new
forms of domestic relations to be created or recognized in the forum
is often a consideration; the more controversial the subject, the
greater the significance of this factor. The importance of local
control and decision is underscored by references in many of these
cases to the policy-making function of the legislature or of
democratic processes. Judicial deference to and reference to
legislative power to decide the issue in a way favorable to embracing
new f(mns of domestic relationships confirms the perception that as
to matters of family relationships, domestic policy-making, and not
comity, is the controlling consideration.
This is not a novel approach. While most scholarly discussion of
the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws focuses on the choice
considerations of section 6, subsection 2, and the various "most
significant relationship" specific applications, the drafter of that
inf1uential body of recommendations also gave priority to local
policies. For example, section 6, subsection 1 reads: "A court,
subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive
of its own state on choice of law. " 268 Regarding constitutional
considerations (such as Full Faith and Credit) and vertical choice of
law, the Restatement (Second) also provides:
A judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be
recognized or enforced in a sister State if such recognition or
enforcement is not required by the national policy of full faith and
credit because it would involve an improper interference with
important interests of the sister State. 269

Many leading scholarly advocates of governmental interest
analysis have emphasized respect for forum sovereignty. 27° For
example, Brainerd Currie, the father of modern governmental
interest analysis in choice of law, famously said: "We would be better
ofT without choice of law rules. We would be better off if Congress

268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CO"'FLICTS OF LAWS§ 6( l) ( 1971 ).
269. I d.§ 103.
270. Likewise, Professor Brainerd Currie emphasized deference to forum sovereignty in a
number of contexts. See, C.Jf., Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
LaJl'S, ill SELECTEIJ ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF J.AWS ( 1963).
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were to give some attention to problems of private law, and were to
legislate concerning the choice between conflicting state interests in
some of the specific areas in which the need f(x solutions is
serious." 271 He suggested, in the meantime, that in choice of law
cases: "Normally, even in cases involving foreign clements, the court
should be expected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of
decision found in the law of the forum." 272 His approach avoided
judicial policy-preference in solving choice of law cases and
encouraged judicial respect for the policy choices of the local
sovereign. 273
Without attempting to oversimplify, it is fair to say that respect
tor and deference to sovereignty considerations of the t(Jrum
sovereign have always played a part in sophisticated conflicts analysis,
even under the principles of governmental interests analysis. As
Professor Paul has explained,
In both the classical and the broader senses, comity rationalizes this
tension [between preeminence of local sovereignty and respect ti:1r
the equality of other sovereigns] in two ways. first, courts often usc
comity to relate difterent categories of law and policy, t()r example
at the border of law and public policy, public and private law,

271. Id. at 177, 1S3-IR7.
272. Id.
273. Currie further recommended:
2. When it is suggested that the law of a tcxcign state should furnish the rule of
decision, the court should, tirst of all, determine the governmental policy expressed
in the law of the f(>rum. It should then inquire whether the relation of the fc>rum to
the case is such as to provide a legitimate basis f(>r the assertion of an interest in the
application of that policy. This process is essentially the t:m1iliar one of construction
or interpretation. just as we determine by that process how a statute applies in time,
and how it applies to marginal domestic situations, so we may determine how it
should be applied to cases involving t<>reign dements in order to ctlcctuate the
legislative purpose.
3. If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy expressed by the
!(:>reign law, and whether the foreign state has an interest in the appli<a<ion of its
policy.
4. If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the application of its
policy, but that the fcxeign state has, it should apply the f(>reign l.!w.
5. If the court finds that the f(>rum state has an interest in the application of its
policy, it should app;y the law of the fc>n1111, even though the f(ll-cign state also has
an interest in the application of its contrary policy, and, a f(>rtiori, it should apph· the
law of the !i.m1m if the fcxcign state has no such interest.
Id. See also Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. jackson, 63 COI.U,\1. L. RF\'. 1212,
1242-43 (1963).
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domestic and international law, and law and international politics.
Rather than fitting squarely into any of these categories, comit_v
.fzmctimtJ as a bril{qc. for example, comity may intl1se a private-law
dispute between the policies of a domestic and a foreign authority
with political significance, and thus allow the court to decide the
outcome as a choice between competing domestic and foreign
public policies. A.r a hril{qe, comity iJ meant to expand the role of
public policy, public law, and international politic.r in domestic
court.r. 274

IV. CONCLUSION:

THE ROLE OF CONFLICTS AND THE PRIORITY OF

DOMESTIC POLICY

In his 1834 landmark treatise on conflict of laws, Justice Joseph
Story acknowledged that "comity is, and ever must be, uncertain.
That it must necessarily depend on a variety of circumstances, which
cannot be reduced to any certain rulc." 275 That seems to be one
lesson clearly illustrated by the history of how American courts have
resolved inter-jurisdictional conf1icts involving controversial domestic
relations, from English and colonial slavery to contemporary samesex marnage and similar contentious novel forms of family
relationships. The importance of considering "a variety of
circumstances" and not "any certain rule" of comity is also manifest
in the recent cases involving same-sex family relationships.
It also is clear that, both as a matter of historical treatment of
controversial forms of domestic relationships and as well as of recent
analysis of conflict of laws issues involving inter-jurisdictional
recognition of same-sex domestic relations, the resolution of these
issues is primarily a matter of forum sovereign domestic relations
policy, rather than of comity or of balancing competing interests.
The emphasis on comity that dominated much of conflicts analysis of
most other issues during most of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries proved in the past and recent cases involving controversial
domestic relationships to be of only marginal relevance to resolution
of many family law conflicts issues. Rather, protection of the forum
sovereign's domestic relations policy seems to be the first (and often
final) principle. Preserving the authority of law-makers to decide
novel policy issues including whether or not to allow or recognize

274. Paul, .rupm note 49, at 6-7 (emphasis added).
275. STOH.Y, mpm note 141, at 29.
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new forms of domestic relations flows from that emphasis on forum
sovereignty.
There still is a role for traditional conflicts analysis and comity
consideration when recognition of the domestic relationship would
not significantly impair the local domestic relations policy, or, in rare
cases, when the very strong and clearly dominant policies and
interests of another sovereign would be seriously damaged with no
measurable benefit to those of the local sovereign. In such cases, on
the margins, where direct conflict with or serious detrimental impact
upon the forum's family law policies is not at risk, traditional
conflicts analysis still is very valuable.
In cases where significant domestic relations policies of the
forum are directly and substantially implicated, the resolution of
questions about the importation into one state of new forms and
controversial forms of domestic relationships created in another
sovereign is not really a matter of~ or appropriate fi:x, conflicts
analysis. Rather, "[i)t is, at bottom, a political, even ideological
problem. Its resolution will ultimately need to be a political
one. "276

276. Hay, supra note 239, at 279.

1920

1855]

From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage

APPENDIX A

State Appellate or Federal Court Decisions Involving Conflicts ofLaws
Re: Same-Sex Domestic Relationships
2000-07
2000
2001

Gestl v. Frederick, 754 A.2d 1087 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2000).
None

2002

Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 172 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2002).
Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. App. 2002).
In re Estate ofGardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 2002).

2003

Langan v. St. Vincent)s Hosp. of N.Y., 765 N.Y.S. 2d
411,411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003), rev)d, 802 N.Y.S. 2d
476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), appeal dismissed, 850 N.E.
2d 672 (N.Y. 2006)

2004

In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).

2005

Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366 (Va. 2005).
Langan v. St. Vincent)s Hosp. of N.Y., 802 N.Y.S. 2d 476
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005), revg, 765 N.Y.S. 2d 411 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2003), appeal dismissed, 850 N.E. 2d 672
(N.Y. 2006).
Hennefeld v. Twp. of Montclair, 22 N.J. Tax 166 (2005 ).
Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861 (C.D.
Cal. 2005 ).

2006

Cote- Whitacre v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623,
639 (Mass. 2006).
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt.
2006).
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. Ct.
App. 2006).
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Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (W.D.
Okla. 2006).
Bishop v. Oklahoma ex rei. Edmondson, 447 F. Supp. 2d
1239 (N.D. Okla. 2006).
2007

Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007).
Leskovar v. Nickels, 166 P.3d 1251 (Wash. App. 2007).
Langan v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 849 N.Y.S.2d 105
(N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F. 3d 1139 (1Oth Cir. 2007).
Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d l 022
(N.D. Cal. 2007).

See also,
of note

Goodridge v. Dep't. ofPub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003).
Informal Opinion of the Attorney General's OJJ'ice, No.
2004-1,2004 WL 551537 (New York, Mar. 3, 2004).
In re Parentage ofRobinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 1036 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005 ).
Lane v. Albanese, 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 3 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2005 ).
Kn~qht P. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) ( Califcm1ia Proposition 22
prohibits both recognition of f()reign same-sex
marriages and in-state same-sex marriages).
Armijo P. Miles, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005) (Proposition 22 only bars in-state
recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages but does
not bar in-state same-sex marriages).
Funderburke P. N.Y. State Dep't ofCiPil SerF., 822
N.Y.S.2d 393 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
Gonzalez P. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2006).
Godfrey v. Spano, 836 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2007).
New Jersey, Attorney General's Formal Opinion No.32007 (Feb. 16, 2007).
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APPENDIX B

Legal Status of Same-Sex Domestic Relationships
Allowed in the United States
1 July 2008
Same-Sex Marriage Legal:

Three (3) U.S. States
(MA, CA, CT)

Same-Sex Unions Equivalent to
Marriage Legal:

Six (6) U.S. States
(CA,* CN, NH, NJ, OR, VT)

Same-Sex Unions Registry &
Some Benefits:

Four (4) U.S. Jurisdictions
(HI, ME, WA, DC)

Adoption by Same-Sex Couples
or Partners Allowed:

Fifteen ( 15) U.S. Jurisdictions
(CA, CO, CT, DC, IL, IN, ME,
MA, NH, NJ, NY, OH, PA, TN,
VT)

*

~Status

of "Domestic Partnerships" inCA after Iu reMarriage Cases is unclear
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APPENDIXC

Legal Status of Same-Sex Domestic Relationships
Prohibited in the United States
1 July 2008

Same-Sex Marriage Prohibited
by Law or Appellate Court
Decision

Forty-Eight (48) U.S. States
(All but MA, NM)

Same-Sex Marriage Prohibited
by State Constitution
Amendment

Twenty-Seven (27) U.S. States
(AK, AL, AR, CO, GA, HI, ID,
KY, KS, LA MI, MS, MO, MN,
NB, NV, ND, OH, OK, OR,
SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VI, WI)

Same-Sex Civil Unions
Equivalent to Marriage
Prohibited by State
Constitutional Amendment

Eighteen (18) U.S. States
(AL, AR, GA, ID, KS, KY, LA,
MI, NB, ND, OH, OK, SC, SD,
TX, UT, VI, WI)

Adoption by Same-Sex Couples
or Partners Prohibited

Seven (7) U.S. States
(AL, FL, MS, NE, OK, UT, WI)
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APPENDIX D

Legal Status of Same-Sex Unions in the World
l}uly 2008

Same-Sex Marriage Legal in Six Nations
The Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Spain, South
Africa,* and Norway (2009)
Same-Sex Unions Equivalent to Marriage Legal
in Fourteen Nations
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Finland,
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Slovenia, South
Africa*, Andorra, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
New Zealand
Same-Sex Unions Registry & Some Benefits in at
least Seven Nations
Argentina, Columbia, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Israel, Portugal
Thirty-seven (37) of 191 Sovereign Nations
( 19%) Have Constitutional Provisions Explicitly
or Implicitly Defining Marriage As Union of Man
and Woman
Armenia (art. 32), Azerbaijan (art. 34), Belarus (art.
32), Brazil (art. 226), Bulgaria (art. 46), Burkina
Paso (art. 23), Cambodia (art. 45), Cameroon (art.
16), China (art. 49), Columbia (art. 42), Cuba (art.
43 ), Ecuador (art. 33 ), Eritrea (art. 22 ), Ethiopia
(art. 34), Gambia (art. 27), Honduras (art. 112),
Japan (art. 24), Latvia (art. 110- Dec. 2005),
Lithuania (art. 31), Malawi (art. 22), Moldova (art.
48), Montenegro (art. 71), Namibia (art. 14),
Namibia (art. 14), Nicaragua (art. 72), Paraguay
(arts. 49, 51, 52), Peru (art. 5), Poland (art. 18),
Serbia (art. 62 ), Somalia (art. 2.7), Suriname (art.
35 ), Swaziland Constitution (art. 27), Tajiksistan
(art. 33), Turkmenistan (art. 25), Uganda (art. 31),
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Ukraine (art. 51), Venezuela (art. 77), Vietnam (art.
64). See also Mongolia (art. 16), Hong Kong Bill of
Rights ofl99l (art. 19).
Examples: Article ll 0 of the Constitution of Latvia
now reads: "The State shall protect and support
marriage a union between a man and a woman .... "
Article 46 of the Constitution of Bulgaria provides:
"( l) Matrimony is a free union between a man and a
woman . ... "

Eighty-five (85) nations have substantive
constitutional provisions protecting "marriage"
and one hundred fifty-one (151) have
constitutional provisions protecting "family"
(By Comparison Sodomy Still is Illegal in 67 +
Nations and a Capital Offense in 9 Nations:
Mghanistan, Iran, Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE, Yemen)
Maior Sources: Elizabeth Kukura, Finding Family: Considering the R.ecOJJnition of
Same-Sex Families in Human Rights Law and the European Court of Human Ri._qhts,
13 HUM. RTs. BR. (ISSUE 2) 17, 17-18 (2006); Sodomy Laws, Laws Around the
World, available at http:/ /sodomylaws.orgjworld/world.htm (last visited Jan. 8,
2009); and National Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage (Jan.
2007), available at http:/ /www.ncsl.org/programs/ cyf/samesex.htm.

* = South Africa law is ambiguous, so it is double-counted.
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